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Abstract 
Rawlsian political philosophers and theorists approach climate justice using ideal theories of the 
fair distribution of climate change burdens, and the rights to be protected in the face of those 
burdens.   Other theorists and activists embrace these ideal principles, but also identify structural 
causes of climate injustice, calling for the profound transformation of the global political, 
economic, and cultural order.  Using a Foucaultian framework, this thesis argues that liberal and 
activist discourses of climate justice are specific configurations of power/knowledge with 
particular constraints and material effects.  Distributive and rights-based climate justice 
discourses vitiate the voices of those most affected by climate change, overlook and conceal root 
causes of climate injustice, marginalise alternative political projects, and thereby reinforce 
existing power relations.  By contrast, across critical, utopian, and spatial dimensions, activist 
climate justice discourse exposes and confronts these fundamental relations of oppression and 
domination.   
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Introduction 
Discourses of climate justice have academic roots in political philosophy.  Although some 
political theorists analysed the justice issues associated with climate change in the 1990s, debate 
about climate justice has only proliferated in academia in the last decade as climate change has 
moved up the global policy agenda.  Liberal climate justice scholars are influenced by John 
Rawls and the publication of A Theory of Justice, a watershed moment in political philosophy 
instigating a shift from the dominant utilitarianism of the time to rights-oriented liberalism.  
Rawls’ ideal theory of two central principles of justice, consisting of equal rights and liberties 
and the difference principle, has profoundly shaped political philosophy today.  This influence is 
seen clearly in the literature on climate justice, in which principles of the ideal distribution of 
climate change burdens and the rights to be protected in this context are debated. 
 
Climate justice discourses have activist roots in the campaigning work of NGOs.  Building on a 
history of campaigning for environmental justice, climate justice emerged on the global stage at 
the 2002 UN World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg.  During that summit 
the International Climate Justice Network proposed The Bali principles of climate justice, which 
themselves were modelled on the Principles of environmental justice drafted at the First National 
People of Colour Environmental Leadership Summit, held in 1991 in Washington D.C.  The Bali 
principles initiated a decade of politicised climate justice activism promulgated by national 
organisations such as Friends of the Earth Australia, spread by broad-based coalitions of NGOs 
such as Climate Justice Now! and Climate Justice Action, and punctuated by peak moments of 
activity around the Copenhagen Climate Conference in December 2009, and the World People’s 
Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth in April 2010.  While climate 
justice activism does embrace the language of rights and distribution, it also offers a critique of 
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deeply ingrained institutional conditions of oppression and domination, and presents visions for 
the profound transformation of global political, economic and cultural systems. 
 
In the following analysis both Rawlsian and activist discourses of climate justice will be 
examined through a Foucaultian lens.  Foucault saw knowledge and power as mutually 
productive.  Knowledge induces effects of power, and power relations generate knowledge.  
Power and knowledge converge in discourse, and shape the particular constraints of discourse.  
Power/knowledge limits the voices that speak, the theoretical norms used, and the phenomena 
examined within discourse.  In addition, the particular constraints of discourse produce material 
effects.  The material effects of these constraints are central to a Foucaultian study of discourses 
of climate justice. 
 
In this thesis I will argue that Rawlsian discourses of climate justice exhibit common constraints 
of subject, approach and content.  They empower political philosophers and theorists as the 
subjects of climate justice knowledge, endorse ideal theory as the right way to do climate justice 
theory, and define the fair distribution of climate change costs, and the rights violated by climate 
change, to be the primary field of objects for climate justice research.  There are significant 
material effects which result from the Rawlsian configuration of power/knowledge.  Distributive 
climate justice discourse excludes the voices of those most affected by climate change and 
neglects concrete climate injustice.  In addition, this discourse conceals the root causes of 
climate injustice and marginalises alternative political projects, thereby reinforcing existing 
power relations.  Rights-based climate justice similarly marginalises the voices of the 
subjugated, but also functions as a form of disciplinary power which produces individualised, 
isolated subjects in need of protection from climate-induced suffering by international legal and 
policy communities.  Like distributive discourse, rights-based climate justice conceals the 
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structural causes of climate injustice and excludes alternative political possibilities, in the 
process bolstering contemporary institutional structures of oppression and domination.  
 
As well as providing a framework for analysing power/knowledge, Foucault recognised the 
value of listening to the voices of the subjugated.  Instead of dictating principles of justice to 
social movements, Foucault draws attention to the ways social struggle is articulated by the 
oppressed and dominated themselves.  It is this perspective which drives the latter part of the 
thesis, in which I highlight the climate justice demands of activist networks.  These networks 
represent those most affected by climate change, including the poor, women, indigenous 
communities, and other communities of colour.  Discourses of climate justice activists are not 
exempt from setting in motion material effects like any power/knowledge formation.  
Nevertheless, I will demonstrate that whereas the effects of Rawlsian discourse are to conceal 
and strengthen relations of domination, the effects of activist discourse are to expose and 
challenge the underlying structures of oppression and domination tied to climate injustice. 
 
Chapter One will review the climate justice literature.  By way of introduction, John Rawls’ ideal 
theory of justice, comprising the equal rights and liberties and difference principles, will be 
discussed.  The remainder of this chapter will trace the influence of the subjects, approach and 
content of Rawlsian theory on debates about climate justice.  Distributive climate justice 
theorists debate ideal principles of distribution, based substantially on Rawls’ difference 
principle.  Rights based climate justice theorists debate the set of ideal rights violated by climate 
change, grounded on the priority of Rawls’ first principle of rights and liberties. 
 
Chapter Two will engage in a Foucaultian analysis of Rawlsian climate justice theory, arguing 
that Rawlsian climate justice discourses have material effects which conceal and reinforce 
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institutional structures of oppression and domination.  The first stage of this argument lays out a 
Foucaultian framework for analysing discourses of power/knowledge, and applies it to Rawlsian 
climate justice theory as a whole.  The material effects of distributive climate justice will be the 
focus of the second stage, and an analysis of the effects of rights-based climate justice will close 
the chapter. 
 
Chapter Three will draw attention to the counter-discourse of climate justice activism.  This 
section will study the critical, utopian and spatial dimensions of activist discourse through case 
studies of Friends of the Earth Australia, the Bali principles of climate justice and The World 
People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth.  The final section of 
this chapter will maintain that, though a low ranking and subjugated form of knowledge, activist 
discourse is nevertheless a form of power/knowledge with material effects.  Yet these effects are 
vastly different from the effects of distributive and rights-based climate justice.   
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Chapter One 
The Ideal Theory of Climate Justice 
Introduction 
Political theorists and philosophers have debated the justice issues associated with climate 
change for more than two decades.  Most contemporary justice theorists are significantly 
influenced by the work of John Rawls.  After an introduction to the importance of Rawls’ A 
Theory of Justice (1972) in shaping the subjects, approach, and content of contemporary justice 
discourse, this chapter will review the literature of both distributive and rights-based climate 
justice. 
 
The Ideal Theory of John Rawls 
The academic literature on climate justice is concentrated around two main themes: the fair 
distribution of climate change burdens, and rights violations associated with the climate crisis.  
This literature is dominated by scholars who operate in a frame highly influenced by John Rawls.  
Rawls’ publication of A Theory of Justice in the early 1970s represented a critical turning point 
in Anglo-American political philosophy.  It generated an explosion of interest in justice issues.  
Rawls’ phrase that justice is “the first virtue of social institutions” (Rawls, 1972: 3) has become 
ubiquitous, and justice has become “the primary subject in political philosophy” (Young, 1990: 
3).  A Theory of Justice also marked the beginning of a paradigm shift for political philosophy, 
from utilitarianism to rights-oriented liberalism.  Rawls objected to utilitarianism for allowing 
the sacrifice of individual for community interests, and set out to construct an “alternative 
systematic account of justice that is superior...to the dominant utilitarianism of the tradition” 
(Rawls, 1972: viii).   
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Rawls has shaped the subjects of justice theory.  Rawls is widely recognised as one of the most 
influential moral and political philosophers of the 20th century.  Like Rawls, prominent liberal 
scholars of justice are overwhelmingly white, male, political theorists or philosophers, working 
in elite academic institutions of the US or UK.  These scholars are the main subjects who engage 
in justice theory because they are best equipped to engage in ideal theorising about the perfectly 
just society and to debate ideal principles of rights and resource distribution.   
 
Rawls has a particular approach to justice theory, one which he terms ideal theory.  He 
distinguishes two parts of a theory of justice: ideal theory and non-ideal theory.  The former 
“assumes strict compliance and works out the principles that characterise a well ordered society 
under favourable circumstances” (Rawls, 1972: 245) and “develops the conception of a perfectly 
just basic structure and the corresponding duties and obligations of persons under the fixed 
constraints of human life” (Rawls, 1972: 145). The main question of ideal theory is “what would 
a perfectly just society look like” (Rawls 1972: 8).  Rawls writes that “my main concern is with 
this part of the theory” (Rawls, 1972: 245).  Non-ideal theory is secondary, and follows ideal 
theory.  It concerns “how we are to deal with injustice” (Rawls, 1972: 1972: 8) and “consists of 
principles for governing adjustments to natural limitations and historical contingencies” (Rawls, 
1972: 246).  Though Rawls makes brief forays into non-ideal theory, the vast majority of A 
Theory of Justice is dedicated to ideal theory.  This approach to justice theory has become 
enormously influential: “the characterisation of perfectly just institutions has become the central 
exercise in modern theories of justice” (Sen, 2009: 8).  
 
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice has also influenced the content of justice theory.  He devised two 
core principles in his ideal theory of justice.  First, that “each person is to have an equal right to 
the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of 
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liberty for all” (Rawls, 1972: 250). Second, that “social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and b) attached to 
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 1972: 
83). This principle guides the ideal distribution of social and economic differences in a perfectly 
just society, and for this reason is often called the difference principle.  It protects the worst off, 
ensuring that they benefit most from social and economic inequalities.   Thus the two key 
principles of Rawls’ theory of justice are principles of rights and distribution.  They are ranked in 
lexical order, meaning that the first principle concerning equal rights has priority over the 
difference principle.  Rawls writes that “liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty” 
(Rawls, 1972: 250).  Equal rights cannot be sacrificed for improvements in the distribution of 
social and economic inequalities.  Together, these two core principles of justice provide “a way 
of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define the appropriate 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation” (Rawls, 1972: 4).   The influence 
of John Rawls on the subjects, approach, and content of contemporary theories of climate justice 
will become clear as I review distributive and rights-based theories of climate justice. 
 
Distributive Climate Justice 
 
Distributive climate justice theory is Rawlsian.  It is ideal theory, uses Rawls’ second difference 
principle concerning distribution, and is debated by political theorists and philosophers.  
According to liberal thinkers, climate change raises questions about the distribution of 
environmental burdens and benefits (Caney, 2006).  In fact, most theoretical work on climate 
justice is about international allocation of climate change costs (Baer, 2011; Gardiner, 2004; 
Vanderheiden 2011).  While most political philosophers debate the ideal principles that should 
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govern distribution of mitigation across nation states, others have expanded this distributive 
focus to adaptation costs, and used individuals as an important level of analysis. 
 
 In one of the most comprehensive surveys of climate justice literature to date, Stephen Gardiner 
(2004: 14) writes that “the core ethical issue concerning global warming is that of how to 
allocate the costs and benefits of greenhouse gas emissions and abatement”.  While there is an 
“ethical consensus on the general tendency of allocation policy” (Gardiner, 2011: 316), there are 
vigorous academic debates on the specifics of fair distribution.   
 
Henry Shue (1993) was one of the first theorists to analyse climate justice.  He applied concerns 
about fair burden distribution to climate change and concluded that to allow for economic 
growth, the rich must reduce their emissions and the poor must be allowed to increase their 
emissions.  Shue uses Rawls’ second principle, arguing that to help the least advantaged in 
developing countries, these countries should be allowed a basic minimum quantity of protected 
emissions, while rich nations should be forced to reduce emissions. 
 
Shue (1999) also articulated ideal principles of equity which justified the need for rich countries 
to take the lead on emissions reduction.  First, burdens should be placed on parties to the extent 
of advantage previously taken.  Second, parties who have most resources should contribute most 
to the enterprise.   Third, the poor should be guaranteed an adequate minimum supply of 
resources.  Again using Rawls’ difference principle, Shue defended the second and third 
principles because they avoid making the worst off even worse off.  Perhaps because of the 
Rawlsian platform, these last two principles have garnered widespread theoretical support.  Dale 
Jamieson (1997) and Simon Caney (2010a) for example, have supported the ability to pay 
principle, praising it for delivering assistance even in the absence of causal responsibility.  In 
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addition, there is broad consensus that developing countries are entitled to an adequate minimum 
of greenhouse emissions to encourage development (Baer et al, 2010).  By contrast, the first 
principle of equity is implicated in vigorous academic debate between competing bases for 
emissions mitigation: historical responsibility and equal per capita emissions.   
 
Shue’s (1999) first principle of equity implies that developed countries should take responsibility 
for emitting the vast proportion of historical emissions and suffer the vast majority of the costs of 
mitigation accordingly.  Eric Neumayer (2000) agrees that historical responsibility is an 
important component of the just allocation of greenhouse gas emissions for three reasons.  
Science demonstrates that historical emissions have caused current warming, the polluter pays 
principle demands that those who caused environmental harms must compensate for those 
harms, and equal opportunity condemns ignoring historical responsibility for unfairly privileging 
those past inhabitants of developed countries and disadvantaging current or future inhabitants of 
developing countries.  The Rawlsian influence is clear as Neumayer asserts that social and 
economic equalities should be to the benefit of the least well-off. 
 
Peter Singer (2002) criticises the principle of historical responsibility for the heavy burden 
placed on developed countries, arguing that for most of industrial history rich nations have been 
unaware of the harm caused by their emissions.  Jamieson (2001) also cites intentionality and 
views pre-1990 emissions as morally distinct from post-1990 emissions.  Singer (2002) instead 
argues that because of its “simplicity, hence suitability as a political compromise”, the best 
distribution of emissions is based on “equal per capita future entitlements to a share of the 
capacity of the atmospheric sink” (Singer 2002: 194).  Ignoring emissions prior to 1990, this 
principle relies on scientific agreement on the safe level of global emissions, an equal per capita 
division of those emissions, and an emissions trading scheme. 
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Though more politically pragmatic than historical responsibility, the equal per capita approach 
also faces objections.  These objections are particularly strong perhaps because by citing political 
constraints, Singer departs from ideal theory.  Ideal theory assumes full compliance, and does not 
heed existing political limitations.  Along these lines Gardiner (2011) is highly critical of an 
ethical guide to action which is based on “political compromise” (Singer 2002: 194).  According 
to Gardiner, it is wrong to absolve developed nations of responsibility for a history of high 
emissions.  In addition, David Schlosberg (2011) points out that strict equity neglects place 
differences and differences in vulnerabilities.  The same carbon allocation would provide 
different levels of basic needs across different climates.  Whether emissions reduction is 
allocated on the basis of historical responsibility or equal per capita emissions, both sides 
implicitly agree that distributive justice in emissions mitigation by nation states is the most 
pressing issue of climate justice. 
 
However, there has been a recent shift in distributive focus from mitigation to adaptation.  This 
conceptual distinction has been present in the policy sphere for more than two decades (Jamieson 
2005), and is present in United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 
1992; Schipper, 2006).  Whereas mitigation prevents the worst effects of climate change, 
adaptation helps people live with its consequences (Armstrong, 2012).  As global negotiations 
for climate change mitigation have faltered in recent years, most notably in Copenhagen, 
political theorists have been paying increased attention to adaptation.  While this pragmatism is 
in one sense a departure from ideal theory, the discussion of adaptation itself is governed by the 
Rawlsian framework of ideal distributive justice.  Steve Vanderheiden’s (2011) article on 
globalising responsibility for climate change is emblematic of this shift to adaptation.  
Vanderheiden maintains that mitigation and adaptation are intimately connected because 
adaptation costs depend on mitigation efforts.  As mitigation is underfunded, adaptation costs 
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increase.  Thus Vanderheiden argues that mitigation and adaptation should be analysed under a 
single conception of justice. 
 
There is also a rising interest in ideal principles of distributive justice applied to individuals, not 
just to nation states.  Two recent monographs on climate justice have presented cosmopolitan 
theories of climate justice.  For both Harris (2010) and Vanderheiden (2008) individuals are the 
most important units of analysis.  For Harris (2010: 100) in particular, although “national borders 
have practical importance” they are the wrong basis for decisions about justice.  Responsibility 
for climate change mitigation and adaptation rests primarily with individuals.  Harris aims to 
overcome the rich North/poor South binary and highlight the obligations of affluent individuals 
everywhere.  The Rawlsian basis for this position is evident in Harris’ argument that the unequal 
divide of rich and poor must advantage the least well-off.  Rich individuals in wealthy and poor 
nations should contribute to climate change costs to help the least advantaged. 
 
Paul Baer and his colleagues (2009) at Ecoequity have proposed the Greenhouse Development 
Rights (GDRs) framework which integrates Shue’s three principles of equity with the shift to 
adaptation and individuals.  This approach distributes costs of mitigation and adaptation on the 
basis of responsibility (first principle) and capacity (second principle – ability to pay), while 
protecting the right to development (third principle – guaranteed minimum).  Individuals have 
the right to unrestrained development below a nominated income threshold ($7500).  Above this 
limit individuals begin to share mitigation and adaptation costs based on responsibility 
(cumulative emissions since 1990) and capacity (disposable income).  The idea is that because 
development rights are accorded to individuals based on their income, “even poor countries have 
obligations proportional to the size and wealth of their middle and upper classes” (Baer et al, 
2009: 267).  As in Harris’s case, the move to make relatively wealthy individuals everywhere 
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responsible for climate change costs has a strong foundation in Rawls’ difference principle.  It 
tries to configure economic differences between rich and poor to best help the least well-off.  
While the GDRs framework has been criticised for reducing the right to development to a 
particular income threshold (Schlosberg 2009), it has gained influence in policy circles by 
encompassing a broad array of key principles of climate justice. 
 
Distributive climate justice theory is thoroughly Rawlsian.  Its subjects are predominantly 
political philosophers and theorists, its approach is ideal theory, and its content is based 
substantially on Rawls’ difference principle.   
 
Rights-based Climate Justice 
 
The subjects, approach and content of rights-based climate justice discourse are also shaped by 
John Rawls.  It is ideal theory, based substantially on the first principle of equal rights and 
liberties, debated by intellectuals. While concerns about distributive justice have dominated 
analysis of climate justice, rights based discussions of climate change have become increasingly 
popular in recent years.   
 
Simon Caney (2005) argues that climate change violates well established human rights.  Humans 
have fundamental interests not to suffer from drought, infectious diseases, flooding and enforced 
relocation, and because climate change causes such effects, “persons have the human right not to 
suffer from the disadvantages generated by global climate change” (Caney, 2005: 768).  Caney 
defends this as a strong moral frame because, unlike the historical responsibility principle, it 
does not rely on causal responsibility.  Whether or not climate change is anthropogenic, it still 
17 
 
violates basic human rights.  Caney’s focus on rights as the key issue of climate justice mirrors 
Rawls’ priority of equal rights and liberties as the first principle of his theory of justice. 
 
Caney (2010b) specifies three basic human rights violated by climate change: life, health and 
subsistence.  He (2010b: 76-80) frames the rights violated by climate change minimally to garner 
widespread support.   Climate change violates existing human rights laws “not to be arbitrarily 
deprived of life”, the right that “others do not act so as to create serious threats to their health” 
and the right that “other people do not act so as to deprive them of the means of subsistence”.  
These are negative rights, providing no guarantee of positive rights to food or to be maximally 
healthy.   Caney (2006) argues that because humans do cause climate change, emitters of 
greenhouse gases are guilty of human rights violations and must be condemned.  
 
It seems that Caney is departing from ideal theory here.  Where the Rawlsian approach abstracts 
from existing reality, Caney makes pragmatic appeals to the enforcement of existing 
international human rights law.  Yet fundamentally he is still in the domain of ideal theory.  He 
is not primarily concerned with “how we are to deal with injustice” (Rawls, 1972: 8), but with a 
case for a rights-based approach to climate justice rooted in Rawls’ first ideal principle of equal 
rights and liberties.     
 
Derek Bell (2011) agrees that climate change violates basic human rights.  He maintains that 
climate change threatens “human rights to life, physical security, subsistence and health” (Bell, 
2011: 100) and is adamant that human rights “provide the strongest moral protection we can 
offer” (Bell, 2011: 103).  Bell develops the human rights framing of climate justice by 
elaborating the duties connected with the rights threatened by climate change.  We each have a 
general duty to support effective institutions that protect the rights of current and future persons 
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threatened by climate change.  We also have a specific duty “not to accept benefits that result 
from human rights violations” (Bell, 2011: 120), entailing an entitlement to no more emissions 
than the level that would be allowed by effective institutions.  Bell thus fleshes out the 
obligations implied by a human rights framing of climate justice. His discussion of rights and 
duties reflects Rawls’ discussion of the “basic rights and duties in the basic institutions of 
society” (Rawls, 1972: 4). 
 
Other theorists use a more expansive rights-based approach which explores the environmental or 
development rights violated by climate change.  Henry Shue’s 1980 work Basic Rights has 
influenced more recent discussions of environmental rights violated by climate change.  In that 
work he identifies “unpolluted air, unpolluted water, adequate food, adequate clothing, adequate 
shelter and minimal preventative health care” (Shue, 1980: 23) as basic rights of subsistence.  
Vanderheiden (2008) builds on the environmental theme in Shue’s account of basic subsistence 
rights and Tim Hayward’s (2005) ideas about environmental rights.  Vanderheiden (2008: 252) 
argues that because of the necessity of a stable climate for human welfare, there exists “a right to 
an adequate environment with the corollary that the right includes a claim to climatic stability”.  
Extending rights to the environmental sphere, Shue, Hayward and Vanderheiden are all faithful 
to the Rawlsian priority of equal rights and liberties. 
 
Similarly, Shue’s early work on the right to development has influenced later development rights 
theorists.  Shue (1993) argued that emissions of the poor should be allowed to rise to provide a 
minimally decent standard of living, and distinguished such emissions from the luxury emissions 
of rich countries.  As discussed previously, Shue’s (1999) third principle of equity defends the 
guarantee of an adequate minimum quantity of resources.  These arguments are effectively 
arguments for the right to development for poor nations.  Hayward (2007: 432) connected this 
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position to the difference principle with his statement that “those who are concerned particularly 
about the position of the worst off globally invoke a human right to...sufficient emissions for 
subsistence.”  Hayward problematises this stance, arguing that this equates to a human right to 
pollute which would “only further exacerbate the threats of global climate change” (2007: 448).  
Instead he proposes a framework broader than emissions rights, encompassing equal rights to 
ecological space.  He claims that this would protect the rights of the worst off without 
recognising the right to pollute.   
 
Baer et al (2009) also discuss development rights through the GDRs framework.  GDRs embody 
the two principles of justice according to Rawls.  They emphasise that everyone has the equal 
right to develop unconstrained by mitigation and adaptation responsibilities below individual 
income of $7500.  This equal right to develop has the twin function of serving the difference 
principle, because it aids the worst off.  Relatively wealthy individuals are required to contribute 
to mitigation and adaptation costs to help the last advantaged. 
 
The rights-based approach to climate justice thus has two main currents.  Theorists such as 
Caney and Bell present compelling cases that climate change violates existing basic human 
rights, while Vanderheiden, and Baer et al extend this framework to include the environmental 
and development rights violations that are a product of anthropogenic climate change.  Both 
strains of rights-based climate justice theory are grounded in the primacy of equal rights and 
liberties in Rawls’ theory of justice.  Rights-based climate justice is advocated by intellectuals of 
the Global North, approaches justice using ideal theory, and has roots in the Rawlsian priority of 
equal rights and liberties over the difference principle.  
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Conclusion  
Political theorists and philosophers frame climate change as a justice issue.  The subjects, 
approach and content of this theory are significantly influenced by A Theory of Justice.  In the 
two dominant approaches of climate justice theory, Rawls’ two ideal principles of a perfectly just 
society are invoked.  Distributive climate justice scholars ground their arguments in Rawls’ 
difference principle.  Rights-based climate justice theorists echo the priority of Rawls’ first 
principle of equal rights and liberties in their arguments that climate change violates a suite of 
human, environmental and development rights.  Thus climate justice theorists mobilise Rawlsian 
principles of justice to protect the vulnerable from the worst impacts of climate change. 
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Chapter Two 
Power/Knowledge in Rawlsian Climate Justice Discourse 
Introduction 
Rawlsian climate justice discourse comprises ideal principles of distribution and rights.  From a 
Foucaultian perspective, this discourse is a particular formation of power/knowledge exhibiting 
specific constraints, with material effects.  This chapter will argue that the effects of ideal 
climate justice theory are to conceal and reinforce existing institutional structures of oppression 
and domination.  The first section will apply the Foucaultian framework to Rawlsian climate 
justice discourse in general.  I will then examine the material effects of distributive climate 
justice, and close the chapter with a discussion of the effects of rights-based climate justice. 
 
Power/Knowledge in Ideal Climate Justice Theory 
 
Michel Foucault conceptualised the relationship between power and knowledge as mutually 
constitutive.  Power and knowledge combine in discourse and constrain its subjects, approach, 
and content.  Through this lens the discursive practices of Rawlsian climate justice theory limit 
the discourse to intellectuals who construct ideal theories of distribution and rights.  Foucault 
also dissolved the theory/practice divide, emphasising that discourses have material effects.  
Discourses define and enable, but also silence and marginalise.  This section will lay out the 
relevant tools of power/knowledge analysis, and offer two caveats to this Foucaultian analysis of 
discourses of climate justice. 
 
Foucault tied power relations to the production of knowledge.  He maintained that “power and 
knowledge directly imply one another...there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute 
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at the same time power relations” (Foucault, 1977a: 27).  Foucault denied that systems of 
knowledge and truth could be produced independent of power relations: “it is not the activity of 
the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or resistant to power, but 
power/knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that 
determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge” (Foucault, 1977a: 28). Knowledge is 
ineluctably shaped by, and productive of, power relations. 
 
This positive dimension of power is crucial for Foucault.  He writes: 
 
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 
‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’.  In fact, 
power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth.  
The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production 
(Foucault, 1977a: 214). 
 
This productive process of delimiting domains of objects and rituals of truth occurs within 
discourse.  For Foucault (1979: 100), “it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined 
together”.  Power and knowledge are connected through a series of discursive practices which 
“are characterised by the demarcation of a field of objects, by the definition of a legitimate 
perspective for a subject of knowledge, by the setting of norms for elaborating concepts and 
theories” (Foucault, 1971: 11).  In his interview Truth and power, Foucault refers to the subjects 
of discursive practices as “those who are charged with saying what counts as true” (Foucault, 
1977b: 131).  Thus a study of discursive practices entails examination of three crucial elements: 
the legitimate subjects of knowledge, the norms according to which theories are made 
(theoretical approach), and the field of objects examined by the discourse (content).  
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Applying this Foucaultian framework, it is clear that the discursive practices of liberal climate 
justice theory produce particular “domains of objects and rituals of truth” (Foucault, 1977a: 214).  
As discussed in Chapter One, the legitimate subjects, theoretical approach, and content of 
climate justice theory emerge from the shadow of Rawls.  Like Rawls, political philosophers and 
theorists such as Henry Shue, Peter Singer and Simon Caney are the subjects charged with 
constructing theories of climate justice.   As for Rawls’ general theory of justice, the legitimate 
theoretical approach to climate justice is ideal theory, which analyses the perfectly just society 
under conditions of climate change.  In addition, the field of objects for liberal climate justice 
discourse consists of distribution and rights, based on Rawls’ two principles of justice.  Climate 
justice is firstly about the ideal principles of distribution of greenhouse gas emissions and the 
financial burdens of mitigation and adaptation, to nation states, or to individuals.  Climate justice 
is also about the ways in which climate change threatens universal basic rights to life, health and 
subsistence, and the duties these threats generate for nation states or individuals.   
 
This is not to claim that climate justice theory is monolithic.  We should heed the warning of 
development theorist Rita Abrahamsen that: “almost any analysis of this nature runs the risk of 
representing discourse as monolithic, unchanging and unchallenged, of constructing consensus 
where diversity, discourse and flexibility exist” (Abrahamsen, 2000: x).  There is indeed 
diversity and disagreement in climate justice theory.  Neumayer (2000) and Singer (2002) debate 
whether historical responsibility or equal per capita emissions are better principles for 
distribution of emissions.  While Shue (1993; 1999) and Gardiner (2004) focus on the ideal 
distribution of the costs of mitigation, Vanderheiden (2011) and Harris (2010) broaden the 
discussion to the costs of adaptation.  As Singer (2002) and Gardiner (2004) concentrate on 
distribution of burdens across nation states, Harris (2010) and Baer et al (2009; 2010) consider 
individuals.  Whereas Caney (2005; 2006; 2010b) and Bell (2011) restrict their analyses to 
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existing rights, Vanderheiden (2008) and Baer et al (2009; 2010) extend their theories to new 
rights such as the right to an adequate environment and the right to development.   
 
Nevertheless, these debates still occur within common discursive practices.  Neumayer (2000), 
Singer (2002), and Gardiner (2010) all use the ideal theory of distribution as the key touchstone 
for their analysis.  Caney (2005; 2006; 2010b), Bell (2011), and Hayward (2005; 2007) use 
rights as the central concept of their analysis.  Some Rawlsian theorists such as Shue (1993; 
1999), Vanderheiden (2008; 2011) and Baer et al (2009; 2010) have debated both distribution 
and rights.  While there are strong disagreements within the field of climate justice theory, these 
scholars all participate in discursive practices of power/knowledge in which the subjects of 
knowledge, theoretical norms, and domains of objects are similarly constrained. 
 
A Foucaultian framework also highlights the material effects of these constraints. For David 
Howarth (2000: 81), Foucault “emphasises the materiality and positivity of discourse.”  He 
rejects the idea of a clear divide between theory and practice.  For Clare O’Farrell (2005: 71), 
Foucault “is opposed to the idea of ‘thought’ as something divorced from action and from real 
experience”.  Theory is practice generated in a particular time and place, by specific individuals, 
and with concrete effects in the material world.  Foucault dissolves the theory/practice divide and 
emphasises the material effects of power/knowledge configurations: 
 
Has not the practice of revolutionary discourse and scientific discourse in Europe over 
the past two hundred years freed you from this idea that words are wind, an external 
whisper, a beating of wings that one has difficulty in hearing in the serious matter of 
history? (Foucault, 1969: 209) 
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Discursive practices, where power and knowledge combine, have material effects.  For example, 
Charlotte Epstein (2008: 5) draws out the implications of Foucault’s insight that discursive and 
material practices are mutually constitutive in the context of whaling: “when one starts from 
concrete, real-life practices, the separation between the ideational or the discursive and the 
material collapses insofar as what is said about whales is tied to what is done about them.”  
Discourses of whaling “delimit the possibilities for action” (Epstein, 2008: 2) on whaling.  
 
Discourses demarcate possibilities for action through subject, approach and content constraints 
which represent a series of “exclusions and selections” (Foucault, 1971: 11).  Jennifer Milliken 
(1999: 229) explains these exclusions and selections.  Discourses: 
 
work to define and to enable, and also to silence and exclude, for example, by limiting 
and restricting authorities and experts to some groups, but not others, endorsing a 
certain common sense, but making other modes of categorizing and judging meaningless, 
impracticable, inadequate or otherwise disqualified. 
 
Foucault terms the forms of knowledge silenced by a dominant discourse “subjugated 
knowledges” (Foucault, 1976a: 82).  These kinds of knowledge are seen as “low-ranking” and 
“disqualified as inadequate” (Foucault, 1976a: 82) by the dominant discourse.  Foucault observes 
that dominant discourses are often “global, totalitarian theories” (Foucault, 1976a: 80), whereas 
subjugated knowledge, particularly popular knowledge, is “local”, “regional”, “differential” and 
“owes its force only to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding it” 
(Foucault, 1977b: 82).  Applying this distinction to discourses of climate justice, Rawlsian 
discourses are dominant global theories, and popular climate justice knowledge encompasses the 
26 
 
discourses of a myriad of climate justice activists operating in local groups as well as those 
joined in internationally connected networks.   
 
As products and producers of power relations, neither types of discourse are exempt from the 
constraints and effects of the power/knowledge connection.  Thus a Foucaultian study of climate 
justice discourses examines the material effects of both Rawlsian and activist power/knowledge, 
and draws attention to the silences, exclusions, and voices marginalised by the constraints of 
both. 
 
Two clarifications of this Foucaultian framework are important.  First, focusing on the material 
effects of discourse de-emphasises intentionality.  Foucault stated that “my goal was not to 
analyse power at the level of intentions or decisions” (Foucault, 1976b: 28).  Foucault is not 
asking “who has power? What is going on in his head? And what is he trying to do, this man 
who has power” (Foucault, 1976b: 28).  Instead he sought “to study power at the point where his 
intentions...are completely invested in real and effective practices” (Foucault, 1976b: 28).  
Foucault studies power not as wielded by individuals but located in “places where it implants 
itself and produces real effects” (Foucault, 1976b: 28).   In climate justice theory, power 
implants itself in Rawlsian discourse, and it is this discourse that is important, not the intentions 
of the theorists themselves: “the main objective of these struggles is to attack not so much “such 
and such” an institution of power, or group, or elite, class, but rather a technique, a form of 
power” (Foucault, 1983a: 212).    
 
Second, a Foucaultian study of the material effects of climate justice discourses suspends the 
question of whether one discourse is truer than another.  The Foucaultian approach contrasts with 
a debate in political philosophy in recent years about the comparative worth of ideal and non-
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ideal theories of justice.  Amartya Sen made a significant contribution to this debate with The 
Idea of Justice, published in 2009.  Sen (2009) argues that ideal theory is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for guiding policies and institutions to advance justice.  Instead he proposes a 
comparative theory which instead of postulating ideal principles of a perfectly just society would 
provide a framework for making reasoned comparison amongst feasible policy alternatives.   
Subsequently, many theorists such as Simmons (2010), Valentini (2011; 2012), and Gilabert 
(2012) have discussed Sen’s critique and assessed the relative worth of ideal and non-ideal 
theory.  Similar ideas were debated by Noam Chomsky and Foucault in 1979.  Chomsky 
expressed the view that although ideal theory may be fruitless, it is important to imagine and 
create “a better system of justice”.  He insisted that “one has to estimate relative injustices” 
(Chomsky and Foucault, 1974: 183). 
 
A Foucaultian framework brackets this debate about the relative worth of different systems of 
knowledge of justice.   For Nancy Fraser (1981), Foucault is not interested in the truth or falsity 
of different systems of knowledge.  He is concerned with the procedures and apparatuses 
whereby truth is produced and with the “multiple forms of constraint” at work in discursive 
practices (Foucault, 1977b: 131).  The main problem is not drawing a line between true and false 
discourses, but “how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are 
neither true nor false” (Foucault, 1977b: 118).  Thus Foucault’s response to Chomsky was not to 
engage in a debate about relative or ideal justice.  His response was to highlight how discourses 
of justice are themselves products and instruments of power relations:  
 
the idea of justice is itself an idea which has been invented to put to work in different 
types of societies as an instrument of a certain political and economic power or as a 
weapon against that power...the notion of justice itself functions within a society of 
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classes as a claim made by the oppressed class and as justification for it (Chomsky and 
Foucault, 1974: 184-185). 
 
Approaching climate justice through a Foucaultian lens leaves aside the question of the “truest” 
climate justice discourse.  Instead it explores how justice claims are used by power, or used as a 
weapon against power. 
 
The Effects of Distributive Climate Justice Discourse 
The discursive practices of distributive climate justice have a series of concrete effects.  First, 
while the discourse enables intellectuals to debate universal principles of climate justice and 
speak on behalf of the victims of climate injustice, it denies these people the chance to speak for 
themselves.  Second, by defining ideal theory as the legitimate approach to climate justice, 
Rawlsian discourse overlooks concrete climate injustice.  Finally, the restriction of climate 
justice to distribution conceals decision-making structures of political and economic domination, 
as well as cultural conditions of misrecognition, which fundamentally shape distributive climate 
injustice.  Without a critique of these institutional processes, and by sidelining alternative 
political projects which offer such an analysis, Rawlsian climate justice effectively reinforces 
existing relations of oppression and domination.   
 
The subjects of distributive climate justice knowledge are intellectuals.  Henry Shue, Stephen 
Gardiner, and Dale Jamieson are all philosophers or political theorists working in elite US and 
UK universities.  They speak for victims of climate justice, debating the nuances of ideal 
principles of distribution which seek to protect those most affected by climate change.  This is 
indeed a worthy goal, but the corollary is the disempowerment of other voices which are 
excluded from this conversation.  It has been widely recognised that poor communities, 
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communities of colour, and communities of small island nations, will be those most affected by 
climate change (Davissen and Long, 2003; Dawson, 2010; Evans, 2011; Global Justice Ecology 
Project, 2012).  Yet these communities have no way of engaging in an academic debate about 
ideal theory and lack the necessary language skills, academic training and institutional backing 
that allows distributive climate justice theorists to debate ideal climate justice.  It is these 
communities that are represented by climate justice activists.  Rawlsian power/knowledge 
marginalises these “low-ranking” (Foucault, 1977b: 82) voices.  They are essentially irrelevant 
to the main job of climate justice theory, to determine ideal principles of distributing the costs of 
climate change.  
 
The work of Iris Marion Young and David Schlosberg provides a counterpoint to the exclusivity 
of Rawlsian climate justice discourse.  Young expands “those who are charged with saying what 
counts as true” (Foucault, 1977b: 131) to social movements.  She begins her book Justice and 
the politics of difference (1990) by posing the key questions of her project:  
 
What are the implications for political philosophers of the claims of new group-based 
social movements associate with left politics – such movements as feminism, Black 
liberation, American Indian movements, and gay and lesbian liberation...what 
conceptions of social justice do these new social movements implicitly appeal to, and 
how do they confront or modify traditional conceptions of justice? (Young, 1990: 3) 
 
Whereas the subjects of distributive climate justice knowledge are academics, Young 
democratises justice theory.  For example, Young shows how new social movements “focus on 
issues of oppression and domination” rather than distribution (Young, 1990: 83). She studies 
justice claims of environmental movements, urban social movements, the women’s movement 
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and others which spotlight “broad issues of decision-making power and political participation” 
(Young, 1990: 83), and attends to their campaigns against oppression and domination.  Young 
sees ordinary citizens, social groups, and movements as relevant subjects of justice, with their 
own voice and their own justice claims.  
 
Similarly, Schlosberg has placed movements at the centre of his theory of justice.  In a 2004 
article titled “Reconceiving environmental justice: global movements and political theories”, 
Schlosberg argues that the demands of global environmental justice movements can help develop 
a definition of environmental justice.  He observes that environmental justice groups 
“consistently demand ‘a place at the table’ and the right to ‘speak for ourselves’” (Schlosberg, 
2004: 522-523).  In a series of works (2004; 2007; 2010; 2012a; 2012b) Schlosberg uses the 
primary source material of movements to show the limitations of ideal justice theory.  What 
drives Schlosberg’s work is the fundamental insight that theories of justice can be enriched by 
listening to the voices and observing the practices of justice movements.  Distributive climate 
justice discourse limits the legitimate subjects of knowledge to intellectuals, whereas the 
discourses of theorists like Young and Schlosberg empower the subjugated to speak for 
themselves. 
 
The legitimate approach of distributive climate justice theory is ideal theory.  Theorists such as 
Shue (1993; 1999), Singer (2002), and Gardiner (2010) debate the merits of abstracted, idealised, 
universal principles such as historical responsibility, capacity, and equity.  These principles, 
based on Rawls’ difference principle, set out the conditions for a perfectly just climate-changed 
society.  For such theorists, the key to climate justice is determining the fair allocation of climate 
change costs across nation states or individuals.  These theoretical norms fail to thoroughly 
engage with empirical aspects of climate injustice.  The complex mechanisms by which climate 
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change is tied to social injustice remain unexamined in ideal theory.  As a consequence, 
distributive discourse represents the neglect of concrete climate injustice. 
 
Again, the effects of this approach become clearer when contrasted with the work of Young and 
Schlosberg.  Young is most concerned with existing injustice: either oppression, the 
“institutional constraint on self-development”, or domination, the “institutional constraint on 
self-determination” (Young, 1990: 37).  Oppression involves systematic institutional processes 
which either prevent people using their capacities or expressing their experience.  Young 
analyses existing material processes of oppression such as exploitation, marginalisation, 
powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence.  Domination consists of institutional 
conditions which hinder people “participating in determining their actions or the conditions of 
their actions” (Young, 1990: 38).  Young’s critique of existing material procedures of oppression 
and domination contrasts with the idealised projections of a perfectly just society in theories of 
distributive climate justice.  
 
Schlosberg’s work also highlights the limits of ideal justice theory by drawing attention to 
existing injustice.  He illustrates that environmental and climate justice movements have a plural 
but integrated understanding of concrete injustice, including inequity, cultural misrecognition, 
and a lack of political participation.  Climate justice movements “move from ideal notions of 
justice and equity to how the reality of climate change makes human lives more vulnerable in 
specific ways” (Schlosberg, 2012b).  Schlosberg (2012b) argues that “it is time to turn our 
attention to the injustices of the actual experiences of climate change.”   For example, 
misrecognition and disrespect of some communities is an important contributing factor to 
climate injustice.  Schlosberg (2012b) gives the example of The Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS), which is consistently ignored in UNFCCC negotiations on climate change.  In this 
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examination of concrete climate injustice, he ties misrecognition to a lack of political 
participation. AOSIS is misrecognised, and this lack of respect is an obstacle to genuine political 
participation for these nations.  I will expand on the relationship between recognition and 
participation below.  The important point here is to contrast the approaches of Young and 
Schlosberg with Rawlsian neglect of material injustice.  
 
Finally, the discursive practices of distributive scholars constrain the field of study to principles 
of fair distribution of climate change costs.  Confining climate justice to distribution fails to 
recognise that distributive climate injustice is significantly determined by deeper institutional 
processes of decision-making and cultural recognition.  The distributive paradigm pre-supposes 
and conceals these causal processes, confining its analysis to the symptomatic outcomes of 
distribution.  Until such time as these deeper structures of climate injustice are exposed to 
rigorous scrutiny, there is little hope of distributive justice for poor communities of the Global 
South, who having contributed least to climate change, will suffer the worst impacts.  
 
Young (1990) delivers a lucid critique of the distributive paradigm, revealing the causal 
processes which shape distribution.  Her central claim is that “a focus on the distribution of 
material goods and resources inappropriately restricts the scope of justice, because it fails to 
bring social structures and institutional contexts under evaluation” (Young, 1990: 20).  She uses 
and develops the work of Marx to show how background institutional structures are more 
fundamental than distribution.  Young quotes Marx’s claim that distribution of the means of 
consumption “is a feature of the mode of production itself” (Young, 1990:15) and uses this 
observation to warn against “predominant approaches to justice (which) tend to presuppose and 
uncritically accept the relations of production that define an economic system” (Young, 1990: 
20).   For Young, the Marxist critique that distributive justice demonstrates an “inability to bring 
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capitalist institutions and class relations under evaluation” (Young, 1990: 20), though accurate, 
needs to be made more concrete.   
 
One way in which Young concretises Marx’s critique is through an analysis of decision-making 
structures.  The distributive paradigm pre-supposes decision-making power structures and 
procedures.  Centralised legislative procedures and executive institutions removed from the lives 
of the vast majority are assumed, and “issues of the just organisation of government institutions, 
and just methods of political decision-making rarely get raised” (Young, 1990: 22).  Decision-
making issues include the question of who has the power to make what kind of decisions, as well 
as the procedures and rules by which those decisions are made.  Here Young is effectively 
talking about the importance of self-determination.  This category includes not just effective 
political participation, but also economic self-determination.  Young writes that “decision-
making structures are crucial determinants of economic relations” (Young, 1990: 23).  She 
maintains that economic domination exists not just because some people have more wealth than 
others, but “derives at least as much from the corporate and legal structures and procedures that 
give some persons the power to make decisions about investment, production, marketing, 
employment, interest rates and wages that affect millions of people” (Young, 1990: 23).   
 
According to Young, the political and economic sides of self-determination are crucial in 
shaping fair distributions.  Without self-determination, “decision-making structure operates to 
reproduce distributive inequality and the unjust constraints on people’s lives” (Young, 1990: 23).  
Decision-making structures and procedures can affect “what there is to distribute, how it gets 
distributed, who distributes, and what the distributive outcome is” (Young, 1990: 22).  For 
example, in 1981 in West Warren, Massachusetts, residents were denied an opportunity to reject 
the siting of a large hazardous waste treatment plant in their town.  Citizens organised against the 
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plant, questioning the justice of the decision-making structures which determined the distributive 
outcome (Young, 1983).  Young also links economic domination with distributive outcomes in 
her example of a major Ohio employer closing down its plant.  Citizens challenged the 
legitimacy of private corporate decision-makers creating widespread unemployment, without 
community consultation.  In this case the distributive approach of compensation was 
unsatisfactory for locals, bringing into focus the possibility of a more fundamental shift to 
worker and community control over the plant.  These examples suggest that processes of 
political and economic domination play a crucial role in determining distribution.   Without an 
examination of these processes, the distributive paradigm presupposes such institutional 
structures of political and economic domination.  
  
The significance of cultural processes in influencing distribution, while also advocated Young, 
has been strongly promoted by Nancy Fraser.  Fraser (1997: 14) argues that the injustice of 
misrecognition is “cultural or symbolic” and “rooted in social patterns of representation, 
interpretation and communication”.  Typically it involves cultural domination, non-recognition 
or disrespect.  Fraser gives the example of race, where people of colour are subjected to cultural 
racism, stereotypes of violence or criminality, and attitudinal discrimination.  Neither Fraser nor 
Young deny the importance of distribution, but they do emphasise that mal-distribution is tied in 
practice to misrecognition.  Fraser writes that “in the real world...virtually every struggle against 
injustice, when properly understood, implies demands for both redistribution and recognition” 
(Fraser, 1997: 12).  Both Fraser (1997) and Figueroa (2004) make the important point that there 
is a symbiotic relationship between recognition and distribution, Fraser (1997: 15) identifying a 
“vicious cycle of cultural and economic subordination.”  In the case of race, racist norms allow 
material inequality and this inequality contributes to further cultural devaluation.   
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Schlosberg (2007: 28) links distribution, recognition, and participation together in a trivalent 
theory of justice, maintaining that greater participation “can help meliorate other forms of 
injustice; but those forms of injustice must be addressed in order to improve participation.”  
Fundamentally, fair distribution of resources is unlikely for groups of people who are 
disrespected and misrecognised, and who do not participate in the processes of decision-making 
which determine that distribution. 
 
The unwillingness of the distributive paradigm to raise structural questions about the justice of 
existing social institutions is clear in the literature on climate justice.  While the question of the 
fair distribution of climate change costs is important, it is a function of deep institutional 
injustice, in particular the organisation of decision-making power and procedures and cultural 
misrecognition within (neo)liberal democratic capitalism.  Shue (1993; 1999), Neumayer (2000), 
Jamieson (1997) and Singer (2002) each focus their analyses on principles of fair distribution of 
the costs of emissions mitigation across nation states.  Though they debate whether historical 
responsibility or equal per capita emissions are better principles for governing that distribution, 
they share fundamental assumptions about the institutional context in which these principles will 
be applied.  Existing conditions of political and economic domination go unexamined.  
 
For example, these ideal theorists aim their principles at the global negotiations for a binding 
international climate change agreement as part of the UNFCCC.  None question the justice of 
this global decision-making process itself, nor ask whether this process could or should be 
democratised.  There is no analysis of the power dynamics of countries from the Global North 
enforcing their will on countries of the Global South.  There is no critique of the injustice of 
minimal political participation in these negotiation processes, with the marginalisation of the 
voices of those most affected by climate change: people from small island nations and poor 
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communities of colour.  In addition, these theorists do not question the existing capitalist model 
of economic domination.  There is no suggestion of an alternative economic system based 
around autonomous production.  In fact, such theorists endorse the existing economic system by 
embracing market mechanisms to address climate change.  Peter Singer for example calls 
emissions trading “both possible and desirable” (Singer, 2002: 196).  It is “fully compatible with 
the equal per capita share principle” and it produces “great benefits for the developing nations” 
(Singer, 2002: 196).  Moreover, analysis of institutional conditions of cultural misrecognition is 
absent.  How disproportionate emissions from the Global North may function as a form of 
misrecognition of poor and indigenous peoples of the South is not analysed, nor is the problem 
of climate migrants and the absence of recognition of climate refugees under international law.  
In addition, there is no awareness of how decision-making processes and cultural recognition are 
interrelated and how they can determine distributive injustice.  Fundamentally, there is no deep 
critique of existing power relations in distributive climate justice, only suggestions for 
rearranging the costs of mitigation and adaptation within existing power structures. 
 
Vanderheiden (2008; 2011), Harris (2010) and Baer et al (2009) broaden the discussion of 
distributive climate justice to include adaptation costs and the role of individuals.  The limited 
focus on mitigation is challenged, and the assumption that the nation state is the best unit of 
analysis is also questioned.  Nonetheless, a similar lack of reflection is evident about existing 
institutional arrangements of political and economic domination and misrecognition.  
Vanderheiden (2011) observes that adaptation costs depend on mitigation efforts, but does not 
challenge the unjust democratic power structures behind the unequal burden of both mitigation 
and adaptation costs.  Nor does he raise issues of economic domination and cultural 
misrecognition.  Likewise for Harris (2010), who argues that responsibility for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation rests primarily with individuals.  The possibility that responsibility for 
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climate change rests primarily with structural agents of oppression and domination does not enter 
his analysis.  Finally, Baer et al (2009) provide a theoretical framework which embraces several 
important ethical principles, as well as the shift to adaptation and individuals.  Yet like Shue, 
Neumayer, Singer, Vanderheiden and Harris, they constrain climate justice to a discussion of 
ideal principles of distribution and do not challenge the unjust structures of decision-making and 
cultural misrecognition which condition distribution. 
 
The limited field of objects of distributive climate justice not only conceals existing power 
relations, but in the process it reinforces those relations.  Ideals of distribution dominate debate 
about climate injustice without analysing the root causes of that injustice.  Without critique, 
distributive climate justice discourse leaves the power relations of existing institutional 
arrangements untouched, and by dominating climate justice debate, it sidelines alternative justice 
projects which may confront these arrangements: 
 
insofar as predominant approaches to theorising about justice fail to evaluate the 
institutional structures that provide the context and conditions of distributions, they help 
forestall criticism of relations of power...to that extent they reinforce domination and 
oppression, and block the political imagination from envisioning more emancipatory 
institutions and practices (Young, 1990: 75).  
 
Injustices of political, economic and cultural domination are not recognised by distributive 
climate justice discourse.  It marginalises the voices of those most affected by climate change 
and of those who do criticise power structures, such as climate justice activists.  The 
power/knowledge relations of ideal distributive climate justice theory obscure alternative 
emancipatory politics, foreclose the prospect of richer political imagination, weaken the 
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prospects for public deliberation about the injustice of decision-making structures and 
misrecognition, and thereby reinforce existing structures of oppression and domination. 
 
Foucault drew attention to the constraints of discursive practices, and showed how these 
constraints have material effects.  This section has detailed the material effects of distributive 
climate justice discourse: it marginalises the voices of those most affected by climate injustice, 
overlooks empirical aspects of climate injustice, and restricts its domains of objects to 
distribution, thereby presupposing and obscuring institutional structures which condition 
distributive justice.  So long as subjugated voices and alternative justice projects are 
marginalised, and the root causes of climate justice remain hidden, the effect of Rawlsian climate 
justice will be no less than to reinforce existing injustices of oppression and domination. It 
remains to examine the material effects of rights-based climate justice discourse and to 
interrogate whether this discourse offers an alternative paradigm which more successfully 
addresses the deep structures of climate injustice.  
 
The Effects of Rights-based Climate Justice Discourse 
Distributive and rights-based climate justice discourses have both emerged as Rawlsian 
constellations of power/knowledge.  As such, there are parallels between the concrete effects of 
these discourses.  For example, in both cases the subjects of knowledge are intellectuals, to the 
exclusion of those most affected by climate injustice.  However, different concerns come to light 
when examining the approach of rights-based climate justice.  The ideal theory of rights-based 
climate justice is a clear example of an abstract, universalising discourse.  It is dressed as an 
objective form of knowledge which can abstract from existing power relations.  Basic rights to 
life, health and subsistence are supposedly universal and timeless principles beyond reproach.  
These claims to objectivity and universality effectively conceal how rights discourse is an 
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instrument and object of power relations.  In addition, rights-based climate justice discourse 
operates as a form of disciplinary power which produces atomised subjects in need of protection 
from suffering caused by climate change, obscuring the root causes of climate injustice.  To the 
extent that rights-based climate justice discourse marginalises the subjugated, conceals structural 
causes of climate injustice, and excludes alternative political projects for climate justice, it 
reproduces and reinforces existing relations of oppression and domination. 
 
The subjects of rights-based discourse are predominantly political theorists and philosophers.  
Simon Caney, Derek Bell and Steve Vanderheiden are intellectuals at elite universities in the 
Global North.  The corollary of confining the subject of rights-based climate justice to Northern 
scholars is to exclude the voices of poor and poor indigenous communities of the Global South, 
those most affected by climate change.  As these effects are identical to the effects of distributive 
climate justice discourse analysed in the previous section, there is no need to expand on them 
again here. 
 
The legitimate approach of rights-based climate justice is to debate the relevant set of ideal rights 
and make the case that those rights are violated by climate change.  Ideal rights theory conceives 
of rights in universal, neutral terms.  Rights are part of being human, and can be invoked as a 
means of protection at any time or place.  They are abstracted from existing social context, and 
function independent of particular power relations.   Brown encapsulates this neatly when she 
writes:  
 
rights necessarily operate in and as an ahistorical, acultural, acontextual idiom: they 
claim distance from specific political contexts and historical vicissitudes, and they 
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necessarily participate in a discourse of enduring universality rather than provisionality 
or partiality (Brown, 1995: 97). 
 
The effect of the rights approach as an objective and universal discourse is to obscure the 
contingent nature of rights as products of particular power relations.  Where universal human 
rights discourse claims the mantle of mobilising justice against abuses of power, Foucault 
reminds us that “if justice is at stake in a struggle, then it is as an instrument of power” 
(Chomsky and Foucault, 1974: 180).  Brown takes up this insight and argues that far from being 
an objective form of knowledge abstracted from power relations, rights discourse is a “form of 
political power carrying a particular image of justice” (Brown, 2004: 453).  The central question 
for Brown (2000: 477) is “what kind of rights bring into view, and potentially into public 
discourse, inequalities and subordination produced by social powers?  And what kind keep this 
process ideologically naturalised and discursively buried.”   By presenting as a timeless 
abstraction from power relations, the discourse of universal human rights discursively buries the 
production of subordination by social powers.  It “deprives political consciousness of recognition 
of histories, relations and modalities of power that produce and situate us as human” (Brown, 
2002: 127).  
 
Rights-based climate justice theorists invoke this discourse to protect those affected by climate 
change.  Caney, Bell, Vanderheiden, Shue, and Baer et al appeal to universal human, 
environmental, or development rights which hold irrespective of social context.  Caney (2010b: 
76) examines how climate change violates the universal right “not to be arbitrarily deprived of 
life”.  Bell (2011: 100) argues that climate change affects universal “human rights to life, 
physical security, subsistence and health.”  Vanderheiden (2008: 252) points to a universal “right 
to an adequate environment with the corollary that the right includes a claim to climatic 
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stability”.  Baer et al (2009; 2010) highlight the universal right of all people to sustainable 
human development.  While rights-based climate justice discourse underlines harms to life, 
health, and subsistence associated with climate change, its universalistic and purportedly 
objective approach conceals its own emergence as a product of power.  
 
In addition, the field of study carved out by rights-based climate justice discourse is a moral one, 
constrained to individual human, environmental, and development rights.  Not only does this 
limiting field of objects ignore and conceal existing relations of domination, it reproduces and 
reinforces these relations.  Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power is important here.  In the 
second lecture of his Society must be defended series of 1975-1976, Foucault distinguished 
disciplinary from sovereign power.  Sovereignty demarcated the legitimate limits of power, and 
was used to justify feudal monarchies and later, parliamentary democracies.  Disciplinary power 
was “one of the basic tools for the establishment of industrial capitalism” and represents the 
“exact point-for-point opposite of the mechanics of power that the theory of sovereignty 
described” (Foucault, 1976a: 36).   
 
Sovereign power is exercised from above, whereas disciplinary power emerges from below.  
Sovereign power is centralised and unified, disciplinary power is “radically heterogeneous” 
(Foucault, 1976a: 36) and diffuse.  The former involves mass domination of one individual, or 
one group, or one class, over all others, while the latter is “circulated through networks, and 
individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both submit to and 
exercise this power” (Foucault, 1976a: 29).  Disciplinary power does not function in “the 
juridical edifice of sovereignty, State apparatuses, and the ideologies that accompany them”, but 
in “material operations, forms of subjugation, and the connections among and the uses made of 
the local systems of subjugations on the one hand, and apparatuses of knowledge on the other” 
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(Foucault, 1976a: 34).  Ultimately, disciplinary power is a productive form of power/knowledge 
which “‘makes’ individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals as 
both objects and instruments of its exercise” (cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983: 156).  
Foucault thus sets up a contrast between “on the one hand, the organisation of right around 
sovereignty, and on the other, the mechanics of the coercions exercised by disciplines” 
(Foucault, 1976a: 38). 
 
Foucault observes that these two systems have become intertwined.  He notes that “in our 
day...power is exercised through both rights and disciplines...the techniques of disciplines and 
discourses born of discipline are invading right” (Foucault, 1976a: 38).  Thus discourses of right 
have become procedures of subjugation: 
 
The system of right and the judiciary field are permanent vehicles for relations of 
domination, and for polymorphous techniques of subjugation.  Right must, I think, be 
viewed not in terms of a legitimacy that has to be established, but in terms of the 
procedures of subjugation it implements (Foucault, 1976a: 27). 
 
Foucault’s important insight is that in late capitalism, rights and discipline are thoroughly 
imbricated (Ivison, 2008, Souter 2008; Golder, 2011).  Brown (1995; 2000; 2002; 2004) details 
the material effects of rights discourse colonised by disciplinary power.  While Brown 
recognises that rights may protect individuals from abuses of power, they simultaneously 
“become tactics in their disempowerment” (Brown, 2004: 459).  She asks “in a given historical 
context, what kind of powers produce what kind of rights claims that might become the 
instruments of what kind of regulation or domination even as they confer recognition or redress 
of subject-specific injuries” (Brown, 2000: 477).  Fundamentally, rights are a form of 
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disciplinary power which “produce and regulate the subjects to whom they are assigned” 
(Brown, 2004: 459).  As such, we must examine what kinds of subjects are produced by the 
discourse of universal human rights. 
 
Brown (2004) argues that the rights paradigm is not a neutral framework devoid of political 
content.  Rights discourse functions as a defence of innocent and powerless individuals, and 
deploys a universalistic moral language aimed at suffering reduction.  She writes that “human 
rights take their shape as a moral discourse centred on pain and suffering rather than a political 
discourse of comprehensive justice” (Brown, 2004: 453).  However, “there is no such thing as 
mere reduction of suffering or protection from abuse – the nature of the reduction or protection is 
itself productive of political subjects and political possibilities” (Brown, 2004: 460).  Framed as 
a moral issue of protecting vulnerable individuals from harm, human rights discourse produces 
particular subjects:  “in its very promise to protect the individual against suffering and permit 
choice for individuals, human rights discourse produces a certain kind of subject in need of a 
certain kind of protection” (Brown, 2004: 460).  Marx described the kinds of subjects produced 
by liberal rights in his essay “On the Jewish Question”.  The right to liberty, for example, is 
effectively the “right of the circumscribed individual, withdrawn unto himself” (cited in Brown, 
95: 110).  In other words the right to liberty is the right to separation from others.  Rights 
discourse produces atomised individuals separated and isolated from each other, vulnerable 
victims of abuses of power, whose only redress is afforded by international human rights law.   
 
There are important effects of this kind of moral discourse which enables this kind of subject 
production: it conceals relations of oppression and domination which are the root causes of 
climate injustice.  In a critique that resonates with Young’s critique of distributive justice, Brown 
convincingly argues that rights language often misses unjust background institutional conditions.  
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Where distribution underlines iniquitous allocations of wealth and resources at the expense of 
institutional critique, rights discourse highlights individual suffering at the cost of a detailed 
critique of the structural causes of this suffering.  For Brown:  
 
rights for the systematically subordinated tend to re-write injuries, inequalities and 
impediments to freedom that are consequent to social stratification as matters of 
individual violation and rarely articulate or address the conditions producing or 
fomenting that violation (Brown, 2002: 431-432).   
 
Human rights are posed as the fundamental, ahistorical, universal entitlements of individuals.  
Thus instead of engaging in “political contests” about such things as “relevant parties to 
decision-making” and cultural misrecognition, the rights approach frames social problems solely 
as “matters of individualised, de-historicised injury and entitlement” (Brown, 1995: 124).  The 
human rights paradigm offers ideal principles of individual protection from suffering, but does 
not offer a thoroughgoing critique of the causes of this suffering.  Contingent institutionalised 
social and political conditions of oppression and domination are presupposed and obscured by an 
exclusive focus on the symptom of these conditions: the suffering of individuals. 
 
The work of Foucault and Brown on rights as disciplinary power directly applies to rights-based 
climate justice discourse.  Rights-based climate justice functions as disciplinary power focused 
on reducing suffering associated with climate change for individual subjects, concealing the root 
causes of climate injustice.  Rights-based climate justice produces individualised subjects in need 
of external moral and legal protection.  According to Caney (2005: 768), “persons have the 
human right not to suffer from the disadvantages generated by global climate change” such as 
drought, infectious diseases, flooding and enforced relocation.  Caney uses rights language to 
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provide a moral and international legal shield for the vulnerable.  He appeals to the full force of 
international human rights law to protect victims of climate change.  Invoking these laws, Caney 
mobilises protections for individuals against being arbitrarily killed, and against having their 
health and means of subsistence threatened.  Similarly for Bell, rights discourse is the “strongest 
moral protection we can offer” (Bell, 2011: 103) in the face of climate change.  This discourse 
produces subjects in need of defence against the threats of climate change by the empowered 
agents of international legal and policy communities.  On this view, what poor indigenous 
communities of the Global South really need is the external protections of international human 
rights law.  This discourse does not empower affected subjects themselves to bind together and 
mobilise against climate injustice.  Fundamentally, the rights approach to climate justice is a 
form of disciplinary power which produces subjects in need of the moral and legal protection of 
international human rights law.  
 
Consistent with Brown’s critique of rights, the disciplinary power of rights-based climate justice 
discourse effectively conceals the causes of rights violations.  Caney, for example, devotes 
several papers to a tightly argued case that climate change violates basic human rights (2005; 
2006; 2010b).  However, his analysis of the causes of rights violations is severely limited.  The 
cause of rights violations is simply greenhouse gas emitters: “those who contribute to global 
climate change through high emissions are guilty of human rights violations and they should be 
condemned as such” (Caney, 2006: 278).  Legitimate matters of justice such as political and 
economic domination, as well as cultural recognition, are concealed by this subject production.  
Instead of challenging these unjust conditions, some rights theorists even explicitly endorse 
(neo)liberal economic policies, such as market mechanisms to address climate change.  Caney, 
for example, has written three papers in support of emissions trading (2009; 2010c; 2011).   
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There is a similar lack of reflection on background institutional injustice in theories of 
environmental and development rights.  Environmental rights express the danger that climatic 
instability will cause undue suffering for individuals around the world.  They are less attentive to 
the political, economic and cultural conditions causing that suffering and pay no attention to 
undemocratic decision-making power and procedures.   The disparity in political participation 
and influence of governments and corporations of the Global North on UNFCCC negotiations 
compared with poor indigenous communities of the Global South is not examined.  Similarly, 
the economic policies of (neo)liberalism are not subjected to analysis.  Conditions of economic 
domination remain unexplored. 
 
Development rights do not just leave economic domination unchallenged, they are its promoters.  
Underlying development rights is the essential notion that poor nations have the right to develop 
economically like rich nations.  While development scholars do seek sustainable development 
(Baer et al 2009; 2010), the Western development path is used as the model.  Economic growth 
is valorised, because economic growth lifts people out of poverty.  The fact is largely ignored 
that Northern development, driven by overconsumption, has caused the problems of climate 
change in the first place.  The right to development assumes and aspires to, rather than questions, 
the existing economic system (Salleh, 2010; 2011).  The development model, including such 
measures as technology and finance transfers from North to South, “effectively locks the South 
more deeply into the capitalist machine” (Salleh, 2010: 133). 
 
In addition, development rights demonstrate a form of non-recognition.  For Salleh (2010: 133), 
in the development paradigm, “cultural autonomy is rarely mentioned”.  Development rights fail 
to recognise indigenous knowledges such as the concept of “living well” in Bolivia.  “Living 
well” exhibits an “eco-sufficient know-how” and is practiced by “meta-industrial workers like 
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peasant farmers and indigenous gatherers” (Salleh, 2010: 135).  The possibility of using this kind 
of knowledge as the basis for an alternative development paradigm is ignored by the 
development rights framework as it endorses the dominant Western economic model of growth.  
Whether in the case of basic human rights, environmental rights or development rights, ideal 
principles of humane treatment are debated, but structural causes of rights violations associated 
with climate change, such as political and economic domination, as well as cultural 
misrecognition, go unexamined.  
 
The case that climate change causes suffering and violates basic human, environment, and 
development rights, even if watertight, produces subjects as individuals in need of protection 
from suffering and conceals deeper structural causes of climate injustice.  In the process of 
obscuring these causes, the field of objects demarcated by the disciplinary power of rights-based 
climate justice discourse effectively reinforces existing power relations.  Rights-based climate 
justice atomises human subjects, offering no vision of power-sharing, no project for the 
democratisation of power, and no means to challenge existing structures of oppression and 
domination.  Devoid of strategies to challenge existing power relations, Rawlsian rights function 
as a form of discipline which can only reproduce and reinforce relations of oppression and 
domination at the heart of climate injustice. 
 
Rights-based climate justice discourse also reinforces existing power structures because its very 
dominance marginalises alternative political projects which may confront these power structures.  
Brown (2004: 462) suggests that “the centrality of human rights discourse might render these 
other political possibilities more faint”.  The human rights paradigm offers a particularly 
dominant vision of justice which has a central place in international legal, moral and political 
justice discourse (Whyte, 2012).  The effect of this dominance is that rights discourse “organises 
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political space, often with the aim of monopolising it” (Brown, 2004: 461).  The prominence of 
voices pushing the human rights agenda subjugates voices advocating alternative justice projects.  
It is this dominance of rights knowledge and subjugation of other knowledges that leads Brown 
to suggest that rights operate “in opposition to alternative modes of redressing social 
subjugation” (Brown, 1995: 116).  For example, other forms of discourse may shape subjects as 
an integrated part of a community who collaborate and share power.  This is a different vision of 
the subject to the atomised individuals of rights discourse for whom autonomy, choice and 
freedom from harm are paramount.  Brown’s (2004: 461) observation is instructive: 
 
 since international human rights are not designed as a form of collective power or vehicle of 
popular governance, but rather as individual shields against power, it is hard to see how one 
can move simultaneously toward individualism and withdrawal on the one hand, and efforts at 
collaborative self-governance and power-sharing on the other. 
 
Rights discourse reinforces individualism at the expense of alternative modes of subject 
production which may encourage collaborative power-sharing.  Rights-based climate justice 
similarly marginalises alternative projects for climate justice, reinforcing existing structures of 
oppression and domination.  Caney, Bell, Vanderheiden and Baer et al appeal to the rights 
paradigm because they view it as a powerful tool to fight injustice.  Caney and Bell ground their 
cases in existing international human right law for pragmatic reasons, believing that the force of 
existing law can protect the vulnerable from climate change.  While Vanderheiden and Baer et al 
extend this framework into environmental and development rights, they nevertheless invoke 
rights language which has a strong basis in international legal and policy communities, as well as 
in Rawls’ first principle.  By invoking this powerful framework as a tool for climate justice, 
Rawlsian scholars simultaneously mobilise the material effects of rights as a form of disciplinary 
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power: they conceal the root causes of climate injustice, marginalise alternative projects for 
justice, and thereby reinforce existing power structures.   
 
Rights-based climate justice produces vulnerable victims of climate change who need the 
protections of existing international rights law (in the case of Caney and Bell) or new human 
rights law (in the case of Vanderheiden).  Rather than a comprehensive vision for the 
democratisation of power, rights discourse is a form of disciplinary power which produces 
atomised subjects in need of harm mitigation and external protection.  This discourse 
marginalises the voices of those most affected by climate change and disguises its emergence as 
a product of power relations with universalistic language.  Moreover, as a form of disciplinary 
subject production which re-inscribes individualism, obscures the structural causes of climate 
injustice, and sidelines alternative political possibilities for climate justice, rights-based climate 
justice effectively reinforces and reproduces existing structures of oppression and domination. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has engaged in a Foucaultian analysis of the power/knowledge nexus within the 
discursive practices of Rawlsian climate justice discourse.  It has reflected on the particular 
constraints of distributive and rights-based climate justice, and the material effects of these 
constraints.  Distributive climate justice discourse empowers intellectuals as subjects of 
knowledge, but marginalises the voices of those most affected by climate change.  It defines the 
appropriate theoretical norm as ideal theory, neglecting concrete climate injustice.  It also 
confines climate justice to a debate about fair distributive principles of climate change costs, 
presupposing, obscuring and reinforcing the institutional structures of oppression and domination 
which causally contribute to distribution.  Distribution is one of two dominant Rawlsian 
discourses which dominate the frame for climate justice and sideline alternative projects.  The 
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other is rights-based climate justice discourse, which empowers its subjects of knowledge and 
marginalises others in similar ways to the distributive paradigm.  The ideal theoretical approach 
to rights as universal, objective, and timeless, conceals the operations of rights discourse as a 
product of power. As a form of disciplinary power which produces vulnerable, atomised 
subjects, buries the root causes of climate injustice, and subjugates alternative political projects, 
rights-based climate justice reinforces existing power relations. 
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Chapter Three 
Power/Knowledge in Activist Climate Justice  
 
Introduction  
Over the last decade climate change activism has increasingly mobilised around the theme of 
justice.  Though this activism has grown, it is still difficult to speak of a coherent “climate justice 
movement.”  Instead, the climate justice activist map is best characterised as a “range of 
overlapping, competing and differentially placed and resourced networks concerned with issues 
of climate change and justice” (Routledge, 2011: 385).  These networks provide examples of 
popular knowledge struggling to establish a counter-discourse of climate justice.  There are 
critical, utopian and spatial dimensions to this discourse.  These common dimensions enable a 
coherent study of key documents of significant campaigns, documents, and events across the last 
decade of climate justice activism.  The three dimensions will be explored using the climate 
justice campaign of Friends of the Earth Australia (FoE), the significant movement document 
The Bali principles of climate justice, and the 2010 World People’s Conference on Climate 
Change and the Rights of Mother Earth (WPC).  This chapter lets those most affected by climate 
change speak for themselves.  For this reason I will extensively quote the primary materials of 
activists.  Across all three dimensions, climate justice activists offer an alternate climate justice 
discourse to that of ideal climate justice theory.  After examining these dimensions, this chapter 
will contrast the constraints and effects of Rawlsian power/knowledge with those of activist 
discourse. 
 
The Critical Dimension: Friends of the Earth Australia 
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Climate justice activism is critical of existing social structures of oppression and domination.  
While unfair distributions and violations of human rights are identified, these claims are 
embedded within a fundamental critique of institutions of (neo)liberal democratic capitalism.  
Whereas liberal political philosophers envision climate injustice as the unfair distribution of 
mitigation and adaptation costs or the breach of rights and consequent suffering caused by 
climate change, climate justice activists highlight “the interrelationships between, and address 
the root causes of, the social injustice, ecological destruction, and economic domination 
perpetrated by the underlying logic of capitalism” (Routledge, 2011: 385).  While ideal theorists 
defend principles of the perfectly just society in the context of climate change, climate justice 
activists demonstrate an “acute cognizance of empirical aspects of injustice” (Dorsey, 2007: 21).  
On this empirical account, climate injustice results from historical, social, and power relations, 
and must be opposed by collective political struggle which mobilises a mass movement to agitate 
for radical changes to our political and economic systems.   
 
Friends of the Earth Australia (FoE) has been running a climate justice campaign for more than a 
decade.  In 2012 FoE is concurrently conducting climate migrant, coal and coal seam gas, carbon 
trading and renewable energy campaigns under the banner of climate justice (FoE, 2012a).  As a 
well-established organisation with a history of activism and a breadth of publications on the 
issue, FoE provides a fruitful case study for the critical dimension of climate justice discourse.  
Although FoE does invoke ideal principles of distribution and rights, like Young and Brown, it 
does so within a framework which highlights deeply ingrained institutional conditions of climate 
injustice. 
 
FoE ties analysis of distribution to the structural causes of climate injustice.  FoE (2006a) 
describes climate justice as an “equity framework” which highlights the inequitable consumption 
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of goods and production of emissions and waste of the Global North, compared with the Global 
South.  This frame is used to identify two structural causes of climate injustice.  First, 
historically, it helps shed light on the legacy of ecological resource exploitation by the North.  
Narrowly, this is about “overuse of the global commons of the atmosphere” (FoE, 2006b: 26) 
and unequal contributions to greenhouse gas emissions, whereby the North has thus far 
contributed 80% of human induced warming (FoE 2006b: 20).  Broadly, it recognises “social 
and ecological resources” stolen in “exploitation of the global South via colonialism and 
imperialism” (FoE 2006a).  Second, FoE (2006b) identifies residual structures of colonialism 
which perpetuate unequal trade relations, place unfair crippling debts on the South, and increase 
the disparity between rich and poor nations.  The forced privatisation of public utilities in the 
South, as part of IMF and World Bank “structural adjustment programs”, is blamed for 
decreasing the adaptive capacity of poor nations and further exacerbating the inequity of climate 
injustice (FoE, 2006b: 21). 
 
Rights language is also mobilised by FoE in its campaign against climate injustice.  The strength 
of the analyses of Caney and Bell et al is to make logical cases that rights are violated by climate 
change and that duties are generated by those rights.  FoE highlights not just these breaches of 
human rights, but the fact that, as for Wendy Brown, these breaches are symptomatic of deeper 
institutional injustices.  FoE spotlights the relations between the rich who caused the problem, 
and the poor who suffer the impacts, as the source of climate injustice:  “the ultimate injustice of 
climate change is that those who have contributed least to the problem are those who are most 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change” (Mead, 2007: 20).  This sentiment is repeated 
throughout the FoE literature (2006b; 2007; 2009; 2012b).  The idea here is that even though the 
poor are not responsible for climate change, their basic rights are most threatened.  For FoE, it is 
not just the fact that climate change threatens rights that is unjust.  It is that the rights of the poor, 
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with the least responsibility and the least resources to adapt, will be affected most by climate 
change.   
 
FoE contends that for the poor, climate change is “more likely to be a matter of homelessness, 
food on the table, sickness and the loss of their livelihoods, lands and cultures”  (FoE, 2006b: 4).  
As well as the injustice of disproportionate climate impacts themselves, FoE criticises the 
injustice of Northern responses to climate change.  Referring to a UN carbon offsets program 
called Reduced Emissions for Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), FoE (2009: 11) 
argues that as a result of the program many indigenous communities in the South “are likely to 
have their livelihoods and land rights disrupted or destroyed.”  FoE (2009) endorses the view of 
The International Forum of Indigenous Peoples on Climate Change that REDD violates the 
human rights of individuals and communities of indigenous peoples.   
 
Other empirical aspects of injustice beyond distribution and rights are also examined by FoE.  
For example, as emphasised by Young, the injustice of existing decision-making power 
structures and procedures is scrutinised.   FoE describes the UNFCCC negotiations as elite and 
exclusive, and the international climate debate as restricted to professional lobbyists with 
inaccessibly technical policy language (FoE, 2009).  FoE (2009: 10) affirms that “this has not 
been a democratic debate where most people have been able to have a say”.  Neither indigenous 
peoples nor other local community groups are recognised as an important part of the negotiation 
process.  Climate justice co-ordinator at FoE Emma Brindal (2008) and representative Holly 
Creenaune (2011) both assert the structural injustice of the exclusion of community voices from 
international and domestic climate debates.  
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The economic domination of existing decision-making power structures is also criticised by 
FoE’s climate justice campaign.  Their position paper (FoE, 2006a) is highly critical of 
International Financial Institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund as 
well as the “neo-liberal political agenda” more broadly, for advocating “economic growth based 
on resource exploitation as the only path to ‘development’: generally practices that contribute to 
climate change.”  These are the elite financial institutions which Young identified as having the 
enormous power to make crucial decisions affecting millions of people.  UNFCCC negotiations 
to institute market-based responses to climate change also face intense scrutiny from FoE.  
Whereas Rawlsian scholars such as Singer and Caney support market mechanisms, FoE 
condemn “existing political landscapes of corporate capture and carbon market madness”, and 
try to “undo the assumptions that market mechanisms, growth-based and techno-solutions will 
deliver the ecological goods” (Pearse, 2011: 9).  Imposed by elite decision-makers, carbon 
trading “creates new markets and opportunities for profits, and encourages privatisation of land, 
air and water – it has major implications for equality and people’s ability to make decisions 
about their lives with dignity” (FoE, 2009: 6).  Carbon trading impinges on the economic self-
determination of individuals and communities.  
 
FoE also underscores the significance of misrecognition as a form of climate injustice.  This sort 
of affirmation is typical: “All of us, regardless of race, class, ethnicity or gender, have an equal 
right to a fair share of resources which will allow for a life of dignity” (FoE 2006b: 27).  This 
statement shows awareness of the link between recognition and distribution, as discussed by 
Schlosberg (2007; 2012).  FoE (2006b) highlights the non-recognition of climate refugees under 
international law and by national and international governance structures.  Australia comes in for 
particular scrutiny when FoE (2006b) points out that in 2001 the Australian government refused 
a request from the Tuvaluan government to accept half its population of 11,000 people, should 
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climate change require evacuation.  In addition, FoE (2009) sees that projects such as the REDD 
scheme violate indigenous rights precisely because of misrecognition.  Indigenous peoples can 
be dispossessed of their land because their lives and cultures are dominated, disrespected, and 
worth less to rich nations than the image that they are taking action on climate change.  Without 
recognition and without land, climate refugees and indigenous people are deprived of necessary 
conditions for a fair distribution of resources.  Thus FoE is critical of unfair distributions and 
rights violations, but they are also critical of structures of oppression and domination which may 
causally contribute to these unfair distributions and rights violations. 
 
The Utopian Dimension: The Bali Principles of Climate Justice 
Popular climate justice knowledge is also utopian, proposing alternatives to unjust social 
structures of oppression and domination.  Where climate justice theorists call for the 
enforcement of ideal principles of distribution and rights, climate justice activists call for the 
enforcement of these principles in addition to the profound transformation of the global political 
and economic system.  Climate justice activists articulate “not only the urgency of reducing 
emissions but also the need to transform our inherited systems of materials, transport and 
distribution, energy-generation, production of goods and services, consumption, disposal and 
financing” (Bond, 2011: 5).  Activist climate justice discourse demonstrates not just a concern 
with fair distribution and human rights, but moreover a “transformative utopia grounded in a 
profound socio-ecological re-orientation” (Goodman, 2009: 502).   
 
Civil society demands for climate justice first became prominent in 2002 at the UN World 
Summit for Sustainable Development.  At that summit, the Bali principles of climate justice 
were crafted by the International Climate Justice Network (ICJN), comprising fourteen NGOS 
predominantly from the Global South.  The Bali principles have been enormously influential in 
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climate justice activism, framing the climate justice debate for later emerging global activist 
coalitions such as Climate Justice Now!, founded in 2007, and Climate Justice Action, formed in 
2008, as well as national coalitions, such as the Mobilisation for Climate Justice, established in 
2009 and based in the US.  As such, the Bali principles serve as an important case study for the 
utopian dimension of climate justice discourse. 
 
There are similarities between ideal principles of distributive justice debated by political 
philosophers and demands put forward by climate justice activists.  As for Neumayer (2000) and 
Gardiner (2010), historical responsibility for climate change is an important principle for 
activists.  This principle is embodied in principles seven and eight of the Bali principles, which 
affirm the idea of ecological debt.  Principle seven demands “the recognition of a principle of 
ecological debt that industrialised governments and transnational corporations owe the rest of the 
world as a result of their appropriation of the planet’s capacity to absorb greenhouse gases.”  
Principle eight reiterates this debt and demands that “fossil fuel and extractive industries be held 
strictly liable for all past and current life-cycle impacts” of emissions.  This is a strong version of 
historical responsibility demanding “full compensation, restoration, and reparation for loss of 
land, livelihood and other damages” (principle nine) from the rich to the poor.  Restricted to the 
distributive level of analysis, there are clear similarities between the ideal principles of theorists 
and the utopian dimension of climate justice activism. 
 
While there are also broad similarities between the use of rights discourse of theorists and 
activists, the differences are more significant.  Just as rights take centre stage for many political 
philosophers, eleven of the twenty seven Bali principles explicitly use rights language.  Both 
theorists and activists invoke rights to be free from climate change, to life, security, subsistence, 
health and a safe environment.  However, there are two critical differences between the activist 
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vision of rights-based justice and the minimalist vision of Rawlsian theorists like Simon Caney.  
First, as opposed to the pragmatic negative rights “not to be arbitrarily deprived of life” or the 
right that “others do not act so as to create serious threats to their health” (Caney, 2010: 76-80), 
this key movement document posits a positive, expansive vision of rights that goes far beyond 
basic human rights, or even the right to development and an adequate environment.  It includes 
rights to compensation, affordable sustainable energy, clean air, land, water, food, ecosystems, 
mutual respect, participation and self-determination, and makes special mention of the rights of 
women, youth and unborn generations.  It is a wide-ranging and transformative vision of a future 
where a raft of rights is asserted and protected in the face of climate change.   
 
More importantly, the rights aspect to climate justice is but one aspect of a much more 
comprehensive, critical, and transformational vision of climate justice which interrogates the 
institutional conditions behind unfair distributions and rights violations.  The Bali principles 
identify “unsustainable production and consumption patterns” and criticise the “false solutions” 
of market based mechanisms.  They reject the technological fixes promoted by “industrialised 
nations and transnational corporations”, and demand “profound shifts from unsustainable 
production, consumption and lifestyles.”   The principles denounce existing institutional 
conditions and envisage the utopian transformation of these unjust conditions.  The Bali 
principles thus represent both the critical and utopian dimensions of climate justice activism 
simultaneously. 
 
Central to this utopian vision is self-determination, or in Young’s terms, the justice of decision-
making power and procedures.  Missing from ideal climate justice theory, seven of the twenty-
seven principles are clearly tied to political participation and self-determination.  Principle three 
“affirms the rights of indigenous peoples and affected communities to represent and speak for 
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themselves.”  Principle four demands that governments address climate change in a 
democratically accountable way, and principle five asserts the right of “communities (to) play a 
leading role in national and international decision-making”.  The sixth principle denounces the 
undue influence of transnational corporations in shaping national and international decision-
making, and the twentieth principle “recognises the right to self-determination of Indigenous 
Peoples.”  Principle twenty one “affirms the right of indigenous peoples and local communities 
to participate effectively at every level of decision-making.”   Finally, principle twenty three 
stresses “the right of youth as equal partners in the movement to address climate change.”   
There is clearly a strong emphasis in the Bali principles on ensuring institutional conditions 
necessary for “participating in determining one’s action and the conditions of one’s action” 
(Young, 1990: 37). These principles demonstrate the concern that ideal principles of distribution 
and rights will falter if not represented by those most affected by climate injustice. This 
emphasis is important because it demonstrates the recognition not just of ideal distributions and 
rights, but also the kind of institutional conditions that would create fair distributions and protect 
individual rights. 
 
Economic self-determination is also part of the utopian vision of the Bali principles.  Principle 
eighteen insists that “climate justice affirms the rights of communities dependent on natural 
resources of their livelihood and cultures to own and manage the same in a sustainable manner.”  
The importance of the economic component of self-determination is also evident in principle 
twenty, which recognises the right of Indigenous Peoples to “control their lands, including sub-
surface land, territories and resources.”  Self-determination is about individuals and communities 
determining their own future, and the political and economic facets of this process are on display 
in the Bali principles. 
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The utopian dimension of the Bali principles also foregrounds recognition.  Principle sixteen is 
“committed to preventing the extinction of cultures and biodiversity due to climate change and 
its associated impacts.”  Principle nineteen states that “public policy (should) be based on mutual 
respect and justice for all peoples, free from any form of discrimination or bias” and principle 
twenty asserts “the right to the protection against any action or conduct that may result in the 
destruction or degradation of their (indigenous peoples) territories and cultural way of life.”  
Recognition of cultures underlies these principles and is a crucial aspect of the utopian 
dimension of climate justice activism.  This perspective, like Young and Brown, acknowledges 
that deep institutional conditions of oppression and domination, in which “local communities, 
affected people and indigenous peoples have been kept out of the global processes to address 
climate change” (Bali principles, 2002), must be overcome to achieve climate justice.  The 
utopian dimension of climate justice activism encompasses ideal principles of distribution and 
rights, but also envisages the profound transformation of deep institutional structures of decision-
making and cultural recognition.  
 
The Spatial Dimension: World People’s Conference in Cocachamba 
 
In peak moments of climate justice activism over the past decade, the critical and utopian have 
combined with a third, spatial dimension, to create critical utopian spaces.  These are not just 
discursive spaces of critical opposition or utopian alternatives, they are also physical spaces. The 
World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth (WPC) was one 
such space.  The WPC was organised as a people’s response to the failure of the Copenhagen 
Climate Conference to take decisive action on climate change in December 2009.  With the 
support of the Bolivian government and its allies in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of 
Our America, 30,000 people came together from over 100 countries in April 2010 in 
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Cocachamba.  It provided a critical utopian space of climate justice activism, represented by the 
outcome document called the People’s agreement of Cocachamba (2010).   
 
The critical dimension of climate justice activism is clearly on display in the People’s 
agreement.  Like FoE, it is sensitive to concrete climate injustice, with a critique encompassing 
distribution, rights, self-determination and recognition.  Limited to distribution, there are 
similarities between the discourses of distributive theorists and activists.  Both recognise that 
developed nations have contributed most to greenhouse gas emissions and the climate change 
problem.  The People’s agreement identifies developed countries as “the main cause of climate 
change”, and observes that a US citizen uses on average nine times more emissions than the 
average inhabitant of the third world, and twenty times more than someone living in sub-Saharan 
Africa.   Rich countries “have an ecological footprint five times bigger than what the planet is 
able to support.”  The basic fact that developed countries are responsible for the vast proportion 
of emissions, and that this represents an unfair distribution of resources, is important in both 
Rawlsian and activist discourses. 
 
The WPC also mobilised rights language, but this discourse has a far more critical and radical 
edge to that of ideal climate justice theory.  Both Rawlsian and activist discourses illuminate 
rights violations that are a product of climate change.  According to the People’s agreement, 
“climate change is now producing profound impacts on agriculture and the ways of life of 
indigenous peoples and farmers throughout the world, and these impacts will worsen in the 
future.”  Yet Cocachamba activists focus far more on the causes of these violations.  It is not just 
amorphous emitters of greenhouse gases that cause rights violations, as it is for Caney (2006), 
but specific structures, actors and mechanisms of (neo)liberal capitalism that are behind these 
violations.  At the macro scale, the “capitalist model imposes mega-infrastructure projects and 
62 
 
invades territories with extractive projects, water privatisation, and militarised territories, 
expelling indigenous peoples from their lands, inhibiting food sovereignty and deepening socio-
environmental crisis.”  Rights to subsistence, health, food and water are all violated by the 
capitalist model itself.  Within this capitalist model, agribusiness comes in for particular 
criticism: “Agribusiness, through its social, economic, and cultural model of global capitalist 
production and its logic of producing food for the market and not to fulfil the right to proper 
nutrition, is one of the principal causes of climate change.”  Moreover, institutional responses to 
climate change are also a cause of rights violations, according to justice activists.  The carbon 
market is a lucrative business which commodifies the Earth and “loots and ravages the land, 
water and even life itself.”  By contrast, rights theorists like Caney explicitly support market 
mechanisms as a viable way to address climate change. 
 
The differences become increasingly stark as the activist discourse moves beyond distribution 
and basic rights.  The critique of institutional conditions which prohibit political and economic 
self-determination is radical and wide-ranging.  The existing system of capitalism itself is 
blamed for conditions of domination.  Capitalism is “patriarchal and based on the submission 
and destruction of human beings and nature that accelerated since the industrial revolution.”  It 
“requires a powerful military industry for its processes of accumulation and imposition of control 
over territories and natural resources, suppressing the resistance of the peoples.  It is an 
imperialist system of colonisation of the planet.”  In addition: 
 
The capitalist system has imposed on us a logic of competition, progress and limitless 
growth.  This regime of production and consumption seeks profit without limits, 
separating human beings from nature and imposing a logic of domination upon nature, 
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transforming everything into commodities: water, earth, the human genome, ancestral 
cultures, biodiversity, justice, ethics, the rights of peoples and life itself. 
 
With these passages, climate justice activists in Cocachamba make an impassioned case against 
the conditions of economic and political domination in which late capitalism thrives.  
Economically, a system of competition, production and consumption is imposed, denying 
autonomous productive processes.  Economic policy and economic responses to climate change 
are determined by elite decision-makers without consultation of subjugated peoples.  For 
example, the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) scheme is 
accused of “violating the sovereignty of peoples and their right to free and informed consent as 
well as the sovereignty of national States, the customs of Peoples, and the Rights of Nature.”   
Politically, the People’s agreement criticises the UNFCCC for being beholden to leaders from 
rich nations and not adequately including poor and vulnerable communities from particularly the 
Global South, but also from the Global North.  It asserts that “we cannot allow a group of leaders 
from developed countries to decide for all countries as they tried unsuccessfully to do at the 
Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen.”   
 
Finally, the Cocachamba critique encompasses cultural misrecognition.  The Peoples agreement 
contains estimates that there were 25 million climate migrants by 1995, 50 million by 2010, and 
projections of between 200 million and 1 billion people “displaced by situations resulting from 
climate change by the year 2050.”  A significant injustice of climate migration lies in the 
misrecognition of these climate migrants and refugees by destination countries.  Cocachamba 
activists denounce restrictive immigration policies which do not accept climate migrants and do 
not recognise climate refugees.  The agreement stresses misrecognition not just of those 
displaced by climate change, but also of cultures and ways of life of indigenous peoples.  Agents 
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of the capitalist system misrecognise these communities, “expelling indigenous peoples from 
their lands”, “turning ancestral cultures into commodities” and threatening “the ways of life of 
indigenous peoples and farmers throughout the world.”  Beyond identifying iniquitous 
distributions and violations of basic rights, the People’s agreement attacks the dominant 
institutional structures underlying these unjust distributions and rights violations. 
 
The WPC also offered utopian proposals for alternative institutional structures to existing 
institutional conditions of oppression and domination.  The critical and utopian dimensions of 
climate justice activism are encapsulated with the words “Humanity confronts a great dilemma: 
to continue on the path of capitalism, depredation and death, or to choose the path of harmony 
with nature and respect for life.”  Capitalism is subject to critique, and this critique establishes 
the need for utopian suggestions for alternative pathways into the future.  Thus the People’s 
agreement makes justice claims for fair distribution, rights, political and economic self-
determination, and cultural recognition.  Like the Bali principles, there are some similarities 
between the claims of activists and the claims of Rawlsian scholars.  Yet the claims of activists 
are broader and demand more comprehensive political and economic transformation. 
 
Ideal principles of distribution are shared by both Rawlsian theorists and Cocachamba activists.  
The People’s agreement highlights the “principle of historical common but differentiated 
responsibilities” in assessing the fair distribution of mitigation and adaptation costs, a principle 
present both in the UNFCCC and in the analysis of Neumayer (2000) and Gardiner (2010), 
amongst others.  Historically responsible for causing climate change, developed countries owe a 
climate debt, like the ecological debt of the Bali principles.  The responsibilities of this climate 
debt include drastically reducing emissions, technology transfer, accepting climate migrants, and 
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paying an adaptation debt.  This wide array of responsibilities follows from a strict view of 
historical responsibility as a necessary aspect of distributive justice. 
 
Beyond distribution, groups in Cocachamba embraced the language of rights also seen in the 
climate justice literature.  This vision of rights is more encompassing than the minimalist, 
pragmatic vision of rights theorists such as Caney and Bell.  Within the Peoples agreement there 
is a proposition for the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth, in which ten rights 
are listed.  These rights seek to “guarantee human rights and to restore harmony with nature”.  
Where Caney’s (2010b: 76) pragmatism demands the right “not to be arbitrarily deprived of 
life”, the Declaration asserts “the right to live and exist”.  Where Caney (2010b: 79) articulates 
the right that “others do not act so as to create serious threats to their health”, activists assert “the 
right to comprehensive health.”   The vision of rights within the Declaration is also broader than 
even the expanded rights to environment and development expressed by Vanderheiden (2008) 
and Baer et al (2009; 2010).  While both liberal theorists and justice activists assert rights to 
water, clean air and to be free from pollution, the vision of rights contained in the Peoples 
agreement also emphasises self-determination and cultural recognition, issues underscored by 
Young, Schlosberg, Fraser and Brown. 
  
The People’s agreement points to the political and economic aspects of decision-making power 
and procedures.  It underlines economic self-determination with the “right of peoples to control 
their own seeds, lands, water, and food production...and deepening the autonomous 
(participatory, communal, shared) production of every nation and people.”  This is a vision for 
the radical transformation of the global political economy: “the immense challenge humanity 
faces of stopping global warming and cooling the planet can only be achieved through a 
profound shift in agricultural practices toward the sustainable model of production used by 
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indigenous and rural farming peoples.”  It also draws attention to issues of political participation, 
with the “right to consultation, participation, and prior, free and informed consent of indigenous 
peoples in all negotiation processes, and in the design and implementation of measures related to 
climate change.”  In this spirit, activists propose not only a global referendum on important 
issues of climate change in which “all are consulted”, but also building a “Global People’s 
Movement for Mother Earth” which would “constitute a broad and democratic space for 
coordination and joint worldwide actions.”  More than just political participation, the Peoples 
agreement demands political self-determination.  The agreement maintains that funding transfers 
from rich to poor countries to help address climate change “should not interfere with national 
sovereignty and self-determination of the most affected communities and groups.” 
 
In addition to economic and political self-determination, the agreement places importance upon 
cultural recognition.  This recognition is framed both universally, as “recognition for human 
beings for what they are, not what they own”, “the right to be respected”, and “the right to 
maintain their identity and integrity as differentiated beings, self-regulated and interrelated.”  It 
is also directed more specifically at indigenous peoples and climate migrants or refugees.  For 
example, “recognition of claims over territories and natural resources to strengthen traditional 
ways of life” is clear a reference to indigenous ways of life.  The Peoples agreement also 
demands that the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples be fully recognised and 
implemented, including collective rights to lands and territories.  In addition, the agreement calls 
for the recognition of climate migrants and refugees, and the establishment of an International 
Tribunal of Conscience to punish violations of the rights of climate migrants and refugees in 
countries of origin, transit, and destination.   
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Significantly, the agreement calls for respect and recognition for indigenous ways of life not just 
for their intrinsic value, but for the benefits this recognition could bring to broader communities.  
It proposes “to the peoples of the world the recovery, revalorisation, and strengthening of the 
knowledge, wisdom, and ancestral practices of Indigenous Peoples.”  Climate justice activists 
express the utopian vision in which “the world must recover and relearn ancestral principles and 
approaches from native peoples to stop the destruction of the planet, as well as promote ancestral 
practices, knowledge and spirituality to recuperate the capacity for “living well” in harmony with 
Mother Earth.” 
 
While critical and utopian, Cocachamba introduces a third dimension into climate justice 
activism.  This dimension was also on display at Camp for Climate Action in the UK from 2006 
to 2010 (Saunders and Price, 2009; North, 2011; Schlembach; 2011), and at Klimaforum09, an 
alternative climate conference to Copenhagen (Klimaforum09, 2009a; 2009b).  This dimension 
is spatial, and deserves its own analysis.  In this context, Foucault’s concept of heterotopia is 
helpful.  In a 1967 lecture entitled “Of Other Spaces”, Foucault distinguished utopias from 
heterotopias.  Utopias are “sites with no real place...they present society itself in a perfected 
form...but in any case these utopias are fundamentally unreal spaces” (Foucault and Miskowiec, 
1986: 24).  These are the utopian visions not present in contemporary reality, but projected by 
climate justice activists for the future.   By contrast, heterotopias are “real places...a kind of 
effectively enacted utopia in which...all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, 
are simultaneously represented, contested and inverted” (Foucault and Miskowiec, 1986: 24).  
Foucault gives cemeteries, libraries, museums and early factories as examples of heterotopias. 
As is obvious from the examples, heterotopias are not necessarily critical or utopian.  They do 
not have to critique dominant structures of society nor present visionary alternatives for the 
future.  For Harvey (2000), Foucault’s general characterisation as “other spaces” is so broad that 
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the definition could include concentration camps, Disneylands and militia camps.  Nevertheless, 
what Foucault introduces is the importance of attending to physical spaces which are ordered in 
some other way than dominant physical spaces. 
 
These spaces of alternate social ordering have received increased academic and activist attention 
since Foucault’s lecture was published in the mid-1980s (Moylan, 1986; Soja 1989; 1996; 
Hetherington; 1997; Harvey, 2000, Building Bridges Collective, 2010).  The spatial dimension 
has become an important part of contemporary movements for social justice, such as the 
Zapatistas and the World Social Forum (Tormey, 2004, Tormey, 2005, Robinson and Tormey, 
2009, Curren, 2009).  It has also been on display in movements for social change of the last 
couple of years, such as Occupy!, and during the “Arab Spring”, particularly in Tahir square.  In 
this context, it is significant to note that the Cocachamba conference of 2010 was not only 
critical and utopian, it was also spatial, or heterotopian.  Cocachamba provided a physical space 
ordered differently to dominant physical spaces in society.  This was a concrete place, a 
convergence of thousands of activists from all over the world, from which emerged both a 
critique of dominant social spaces and structures, and utopian visions for alternatives to these 
spaces and structures.  For a few days in April 2010, activists from around the world converged 
to form a critical utopian space of climate justice discourse.  
 
Power/Knowledge in Climate Justice Activism 
 
Activist climate justice discourse does not escape the power/knowledge nexus.  Activists 
mobilise certain kinds of knowledge which are themselves influenced by and productive of 
power relations.  Charlotte Epstein (2005) has pointed out that the ways environmental activists 
use power/knowledge receive far less attention than those used by more obviously powerful 
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actors such as states or corporations.  It would be inconsistent to assess the constraints and 
material effects of Rawlsian climate justice discourse but not those of activist discourse.  Thus 
this final section will compare the constraints of activist discourse with those of Rawlsian 
discourses, and examine the contrasting effects of those constraints. 
 
Fairly obviously, the subjects of climate justice discourse differ between Rawlsians and activists.  
Ideal theorists are intellectuals, usually political theorists and philosophers from the Global 
North.  Climate justice scholars inhabit the halls of universities, and their discourses circulate in 
the pages of top political journals and in international academic conferences.  Entering this 
conversation about climate justice requires many years of academic training, familiarity with 
technical academic jargon, usually that of political philosophy, a PHD, and a full-time academic 
posting within a university.  In other words, the subjects of Rawlsian climate justice discourse 
are academic experts who have decided that what counts as true in climate justice theory is ideal 
principles of distributing resources and protecting basic rights within (neo)liberal democratic 
capitalism.   
 
By comparison, the subjects of activist discourse are most often employees or volunteers for 
national and international non-governmental organisations and networks.  Highly active in the 
Global South, activist discourse circulates on the web, in organisational publications, and in 
critical utopian spaces such as the WPC.  This is a more inclusive discourse in which those most 
affected by climate change have a voice.  There is a risk of portraying this discourse 
idealistically as democratic and completely open.  However, activists often have their own kind 
of privilege.  Engaging with public debate about climate justice requires a certain level of 
education, and flying around the world to spaces such the WPC necessitates a certain degree of 
wealth.  Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to say that activist discourse is more inclusive that of 
70 
 
Rawlsians, incorporating the voices of the subjugated.  There are exceptions to this dichotomy, 
such as Paul Baer and his colleagues at Ecoequity playing the role of scholars and activists.  In 
general though, international academic conferences bring together the world’s best climate 
justice scholars, predominantly white, male, and from the Global North, to engage in a specialist 
debate about ideal theory.  By contrast, the People’s agreement was couched in nontechnical 
language and The World People’s Conference attracted 30,000 people of mixed ethnicities, 
mostly from the Global South.  
 
Where Rawlsian discourse is restricted to ideal theory, activist discourse encompasses both non-
ideal and ideal theory, with critical and utopian ambitions.  Rawlsian climate justice theorists 
debate ideal principles of distribution and rights to protect the vulnerable from the worst impacts 
of climate change.  Climate justice activists mobilise similar ideal principles, evident in the 
discourses of both FoE and the Bali principles.  However, activists also engage in non-ideal 
theory about “how we are to deal with injustice” (Rawls, 1972: 8).  This non-ideal theory has a 
strongly critical edge as institutional structures of oppression and domination at the heart of 
modern capitalism come under attack.  In addition, activist ideal theory is more radically utopian 
than that of Rawlsian liberals.  Beyond debating a rearrangement of the distribution of resources 
and the protection of basic rights under liberal capitalism, many climate justice activists propose 
a radically transformative vision of the future in which unjust institutional structures will be 
overturned and replaced by political, economic and cultural self-development and self-
determination.  This vision entails profound shifts in the global political, economic, and cultural 
order.  Whereas ideal theory neglects concrete injustice and conceals power relations, the activist 
approach focuses on real injustice, and confronts power relations. 
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There are also strong contrasts in content between liberal climate justice discourse and activist 
discourse.  Rawlsians focus on rights and distribution, aspects of justice that clearly derive from 
Rawls’ first principle of equal rights and liberties and second principle, the difference principle.  
Activists also mobilise ideal principles of rights and distribution, but extend the discussion to 
self-determination and recognition.  The critical and utopian side to these aspects of justice are 
both emphasised in such critical utopian spaces as the World People’s Conference.  Both 
iniquitous distributions and a vision for ideal distribution are offered.  Real world rights 
violations and ideal rights are foregrounded, but both the real/critical and ideal aspects of rights-
based climate justice are framed more radically than in liberal discourse.  For Rawlsians, the task 
of climate justice is to redistribute resources and protect rights under institutional conditions of 
(neo)liberal capitalism.  By contrast, in the People’s agreement for example, the task of climate 
justice means denouncing the capitalist model of production and consumption, agribusiness, and 
carbon markets, and replacing them with conditions of economic and political self-
determination.  Thus the content of climate justice activism extends beyond ideal distribution 
and rights, exposing root causes of climate injustice, and confronting institutional structures of 
oppression and domination. 
 
I will close this chapter with a caution.  If a central part of this project is to listen to the voices of 
those who struggle against climate injustice, there is a risk of slipping into polemical idealism 
about this struggle which glosses over the dangers inherent in activist climate justice discourse.  
Foucault once said “my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, 
which is not exactly the same as bad.  If everything is dangerous, then we always have 
something to do.  So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism” 
(Foucault, 1983b: 231-232).  I interpret Foucault to mean that it is crucial to expose all 
discourses to critical scrutiny, and to consider the material effects of all ideas, not just those of 
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dominant forms knowledge.  The aim is to prevent counter discourses and the “insurrection of 
subjugated knowledges” (Foucault, 1976b: 81) replacing existing modes of domination with new 
ones. 
 
The power relations at work in the Cocachamba conference are worth examining in this respect.  
The power/knowledge configuration at the conference was endorsed and supported by the 
Bolivian government and its allies in the ALBA, and as such critics accuse the conference of 
being hypocritical and exclusionary.  On the first accusation, analysts distinguish the critical 
discourse contained in the Peoples agreement from the actual policies of these states (Aguirre 
and Cooper, 2010; Gudynas, 2009; Mueller, 2012; Turner, 2010).  They point to the 
intensification of resource extraction in Venezuela and Bolivia in recent years and the 
commoditisation of nature represented by the oil (Venezuela) or gas and minerals (Bolivia) 
based economies of these states.  The recent economic success of these countries has therefore 
been largely thanks to the increased export of primary commodities.  Director of the Latin 
American Centre for Social Ecology, Eduardo Gudynas has branded this approach as the “new 
extractivism” (2010) and argues that these policies, heavily reliant on global markets, sit 
uncomfortably with the discourse of anti-capitalism.  Such critics distrust the anti-systemic 
rhetoric and affirm that the actions of ALBA nations are firmly planted within market oriented, 
export led growth (Panizza, 2005; Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012).   
 
On the second accusation of exclusion, some activists, comprising Working Group 18 (WG18), 
were excluded from the conference because of their critique of the Bolivian government’s 
domestic policies.  One participant in WG18 , Bolivia’s largest indigenous organisation, the 
National Council of Ayllus and Markus of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) , launched scathing 
criticisms of the Evo Morales led government for engaging with an economic model which is 
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“extractivist, developmentalist, consumerist and predatory” (cited in Aguirre and Cooper, 2010: 
241).  In addition, WG18 organised an action that challenged corporate perpetrators of climate 
change allowed to operate by the Bolivian government.  In San Cristobal, WG18 members shut 
down operations of a local silver mine run by the Japanese transnational Sumitomo by occupying 
corporate offices and blockading train lines (Mueller, 2012).  This scrutiny of the 
power/knowledge connection operating even within marginalised or critical spaces cautions 
against blind idealism about the politics and potential of critical utopian spaces like the WPC.  
The documents produced by such conferences should be examined as products of discursive 
practices like any other, and subject to the same scrutiny.  This does not diminish the value of 
analysing subjugated, popular forms of knowledge, and distinguishing discourses which sustain 
relations of oppression and domination from those which seek to overturn them. 
 
Thus activist climate justice power/knowledge has its own idiosyncratic constraints and material 
effects.  Though broadly encompassing ideal and non-ideal theories of distribution, rights, 
recognition and self-determination, activist discourse is restricted to those with a sufficient 
education and resource base.  To ensure that existing relations of domination are not replaced 
with new modes of domination, this discourse should be subject to critical scrutiny like any 
other. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There are critical, utopian, and spatial dimensions to climate justice activism.  The discourse of 
Friends of the Earth Australia’s climate justice campaign demonstrates an acute awareness of 
climate injustice, identifying fundamental institutional structures of oppression and domination.  
The Bali principles of climate justice exemplify the utopian dimension of climate justice 
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activism, calling for the profound transformation of the political, economic, and cultural order.  
The combination of the critical, utopian, and spatial was on display in the critical utopian space 
of the World People’s Conference in 2010.  In comparison with Rawlsian theory, activist 
discourse broadens climate justice to non-ideal theory with a radical, critical edge, embracing not 
just distribution and rights, but also political and economic self-determination and cultural 
recognition.  Activist discourse is also more representative of the Global South and more 
democratic than the specialist discourse of Rawlsian theory.  Activist discourse is not exempt 
from the constraints of power/knowledge, requiring a level of education and wealth to participate 
and open to the risk of less critical scrutiny as a form of subjugated knowledge.  Nevertheless, 
whereas Rawlsian discourse obscures and strengthens power relations, activist discourse exposes 
and challenges these relations. 
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Conclusion  
Two paths diverge in approaches to climate justice.  In liberal political philosophy, climate 
injustice is framed as a failure of fair distribution breaching universal ethical principles such as 
equity, historical responsibility and capacity.  On the Rawlsian account climate change also 
violates the rights of individuals, including basic human rights, environmental rights and 
development rights.  For climate justice theorists, securing climate justice means securing fair 
distribution of resources and protecting the poor and vulnerable from unnecessary suffering 
within the existing institutional arrangements of (neo)liberal democratic capitalism. Activist 
climate justice discourse addresses unfair distribution and rights violations, but these are seen as 
consequences of underlying social structures of oppression and domination which prohibit the 
self-development and self-determination of individuals and communities.  For activists, climate 
justice means freedom from institutional conditions of oppression and domination and requires a 
profound transformation of the global political, economic, and cultural order. 
 
In this thesis I have argued using a Foucaultian framework that Rawlsian discourse of climate 
justice is a particular arrangement of power/knowledge, constrained to universal intellectuals 
who do ideal theory of the distribution of mitigation and adaptation costs and the rights affected 
by climate change.   The constraints of Rawlsian discourse have significant material effects in 
the domains of both distribution and rights.  Distributive climate justice discourse empowers 
universal intellectuals but marginalises the voices of the subjugated.  It constructs ideal theories 
of distribution, but overlooks concrete injustice.  It limits its field of objects to principles of 
distribution, concealing the structural causes of climate injustice such as political and economic 
domination and cultural misrecognition, and sidelining alternative justice projects which draw 
attention to these causes.  Ultimately distributive climate justice discourse reinforces the power 
relations of (neo)liberal democratic capitalism.  Rights-based climate justice discourse also 
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empowers political philosophers and theorists at the expense of those most affected by climate 
injustice.  However, this discourse also operates as a type of disciplinary power which moulds 
atomised, vulnerable subjects who need the protection of international human rights law.  This 
particular form of subject production obscures the underlying causes of climate injustice and 
marginalises alternative political projects for justice.  As a result, rights-based climate justice 
discourse strengthens existing institutional structures of oppression and domination. 
 
Given the material effects of Rawlsian climate justice discourse, Lenin’s (1902) question “What 
is to be done?” is a reasonable response.  What are we to do as theorists concerned with climate 
justice?  Where can we turn for discourses of climate justice which offer a more thoroughgoing 
critique of climate injustice and more ambitious visions of a just society under conditions of 
climate change?  In the conclusion to her 2004 article “The most we can hope for...”: human 
rights and the politics of fatalism”, Brown asks “Is the prospect of a more substantive 
democratisation of power so dim that the relief and reduction of human suffering is really all that 
progressives can hope for?” (Brown, 2004: 462).  Brown  (2004: 461-462) holds out hope for 
alternative kinds of political projects to rights which “may offer a more appropriate and far-
reaching remedy for injustice defined as suffering and as systematic disenfranchisement from 
collaborative self-governance”.  Such political projects for climate justice would aim to reduce 
suffering, but they would also offer a more fundamental critique of social injustice.  They would 
agitate against deeply ingrained institutional conditions of oppression and domination.  These 
alternative visions would advocate the democratisation of decision-making power and 
procedures, challenge economic domination at the heart of our economic system, and agitate for 
changes in patterns of cultural misrecognition.   
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These kinds of political projects are prominent in climate justice activism.  While activist 
discourse is not exempt from constraints, like any discourse, the constraints and effects of this 
discourse are in stark contrast to those of distributive and rights-based climate justice.  David 
Harvey (1996: 401) observes that environmental justice will only come by “confronting the 
fundamental underlying processes (and their associated power structures, social relations, 
institutional configurations, discourses, and belief systems) that generate environmental and 
social injustices.”  Whereas Rawlsian discourse only conceals and reinforces existing power 
relations, across critical, utopian, and spatial dimensions, activist climate justice discourse 
confronts these fundamental structures of environmental and social injustice.   
 
For political theorists, it is time to analyse and amplify the voices of those most affected by 
climate change and to help those who oppose structures of oppression and domination in their 
struggle for climate justice. 
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